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My dissertation aims to challenge the long-held notion (both in popular culture and scholarly 
discourse) that gender, history, and time are stable constructs by re-examining gender 
ambiguity in ancient Greece. Gender ambiguous people are regularly studied as outliers to the 
‘natural’ separation between ‘male’ and ‘female’. Instead, I examine these cultural ‘others’ as 
queer entities unbound by the strictures of normative time and gender. My first chapter argues 
that distinctions between ‘gender as cultural’ and ‘sex as natural’ are outdated, noting the 
limitations of this framework in studies of gender in antiquity. Instead, I suggest that queer 
unhistoricist analysis, as well as use of anachronistic terminology, could expand our 
understanding of ancient queer gender. In Chapters 2 and 3, I examine the accounts of 
Phaethousa and Nanno (Hippocrates, fifth century BCE), and Diophantos and Kallon (Diodorus 
Siculus, first century BCE), who were all assigned female at birth, but experience spontaneous 
‘masculinisations’ later in life. Beginning with Phaethousa and Nanno, I outline the 
Hippocratic author’s use of language, noting how it, along with the actions of physicians, aims 
to thoroughly control Phaethousa’s and Nanno’s bodies by presenting them as diseased women. 
However, anachronistic terms such as ‘transgender’, ‘intersex’, and ‘non-binary’ can allow 
them to regain their bodily autonomy and truly exist in a ‘grey space’ of gender and time. In 
Chapter 3, I consider how Diophantos’ and Kallon’s lives become medicalised after physicians 
artificially reconstruct their bodies to conform to socially-normative ideals. Thus, they 
simultaneously conform to and subvert gender expectations. By doing so, they show how 
arbitrary, limiting, and fragile the cultural concepts of gender and time are, and firmly highlight 
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A QUEER QUERY OF TIME AND GENDER 
People assume that time is a strict progression of cause to effect, but actually – 
from a non-linear, non-subjective viewpoint – it’s more like a big ball of wibbly-
wobbly … timey-wimey … stuff.1 
Time is incredibly complex according to the Doctor, the main character of the popular and 
long-running BBC sci-fi television series Doctor Who (1963–present). He is a Time Lord, a 
humanoid alien species able to live almost indefinitely by regenerating into a different 
incarnation when they die; they also travel in time and space, and thus become the guardians 
of, and authorities on, time itself. The Doctor moves through time in a non-linear fashion, 
defying traditional human models of life’s birth-to-death progression, and finding that “Things 
don’t always happen […] in quite the right order”, experiencing the future and reliving histories 
at will.2 For the culture that created him, he occupies a non-normalised life. 
The Doctor can also transition through gender. The BBC recently announced that the fourteenth 
iteration of the famous character would be the first female Doctor in the show’s history. I could 
therefore refer to the Doctor not as ‘he’, but perhaps with the singular gender-neutral pronoun 
‘they’. This pronoun has been used since the fourteenth century and is common in everyday 
speech to refer to someone whose gender is unknown or irrelevant, but only with the onset of 
both the feminist and transgender rights movements has it gained wide-spread usage.3  In the 
time Doctor Who was first conceived, feminism was only beginning to gain ground in socio-
political arenas, and ‘he’ could still be employed to describe a person whose gender was 
unknown.4 I could therefore retrospectively use the pronoun ‘they’ to talk about a character 
created in a time before this pronoun was widely used.  
Time and language thus both have an impact on the way we perceive the Doctor, who is 
themselves a culturally-constructed being; they reflect not only our social norms, but also our 
cultural progress. This perspective allows the Doctor to be fully realised as the boundary-
breaker they are, living in completely non-linear time and utterly non-binary conceptions of 
the body. Indeed, their body is thoroughly fluid, constantly changing, and able to reflect the 
                                                          
1 MacDonald (dir.) ‘Blink’ 2007. 
2 MacDonald (dir.) ‘Blink’ 2007. 
3 This is often the pronoun of choice for people with non-binary gender identities. See Stryker 2017, 22–24. 
4 See Baron 1981, 83–86; McConnell-Ginet 2011, 196–199; Stryker 2017, 22–24. 
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perspectives of a society that has evolved immensely since 1963. Using language that has more 
recently become widely accepted in mainstream culture (‘they’ pronouns) fully recognises the 
character of the Doctor as a queer entity. Yet is it possible to apply these ways of thinking to 
the ancient world, to a culture so far removed from our own in time and space? Can we truly 
‘queer’ a culture that we cannot ever truly understand? 
 
1. QUEERING HISTORY 
1.1. WHAT IS ‘QUEER’? 
The word ‘queer’ initially only meant ‘strange, peculiar, or odd’, but came to be used 
derogatively against anyone who expressed (or was thought to express) same-gender attraction 
or love. However, during liberation movements of the 1980s and 1990s, ‘queer’ began to be 
reclaimed and has slowly acquired the increasingly positive tone it expresses today.5 The word 
also gave its name to Queer Studies, the scholarly field which examines contemporary and 
historical examples of queerness, and originated from ‘Gay and Lesbian Studies’. Initially, 
queer historians sought past examples of homosexual desire, examining the surrounding 
context and systematic erasure of same-gender attraction from history. We can therefore 
‘queer’ history by expanding our understanding of the past, and questioning why certain groups 
have been erased from the dominant narrative of traditional history – even aurally, the word 
suggests this: ‘queering’ and ‘querying’ the past.  
Yet for all its rebranding from Gay and Lesbian Studies to Queer Studies, the field has not 
completely taken on the full scope of the term. In contemporary political usage, ‘queer’ has 
become both an individual identity in and an umbrella term for the LGBTQI+ (Lesbian, Gay, 
Bisexual, Transgender, Queer/Questioning, Intersex, plus) community.6 This terminology 
securely locates transgender/trans (T) and intersex (I) people under the banner of ‘queer’. Yet, 
as Viviane Namaste notes, these identities have been “continually and perpetually erased in the 
cultural and institutional world”.7 The field of queer history is no different, predominantly 
                                                          
5 See OED ‘queer’; Gamson 1995, 394–396. Due to the word’s history, it is generally considered inappropriate 
for non-LGBTQI+ people to use this term in reference to the community.  
6 See McConnell-Ginet 2011, 238–241; Stryker 2017, 30. The acronym has many forms and is constantly being 
expanded. The ‘+’ is regularly employed to recognise the many other diverse and/or newly-labelled identities 
under the banner. I will use ‘queer’ to refer to the LGBTQI+ community throughout this work in order to 
emphasise the connection Queer Studies has to the community. 
7 Namaste 2000, 2. From the outset, trans peoples have often been at the forefront of queer liberation movements, 
but this fact is often overlooked. See Stryker 2006, 7; Stryker 2017, 84–113, 120–122. 
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focusing on same-gender desire and eroticism, with transgender and intersex history largely 
confined to the last hundred years. Indeed, many prominent scholars have gone to great lengths 
to separate antiquity from Queer Studies because they believe the ancient world is too distant, 
and too far removed from our own conceptions of the world to warrant a search for ancient 
queerness.8 
 
1.2. ‘FACT’ AND ‘TRUTH’ 
Historians are regularly encouraged to approach the past objectively, attempting to remove 
their own contemporary cultural biases. Yet, this fails to acknowledge two major factors. 
Firstly, every reader will approach history with a unique and powerful perspective. Queer 
history was virtually non-existent until queer people began looking for it, utilising their own 
experiences of marginalisation in contemporary politics and society to combat their historical 
erasure.9 Secondly, history itself is a text, a fluid and unstable narrative formed over a constant 
process of critiquing, expanding, and challenging the past. History is therefore written from the 
perspective of the present, constantly being altered. Viewing it as a stable narrative that 
contains unquestionable ‘truths’ overlooks its artificially-constructed nature, and 
oversimplifies the complexity of the past into a single linear narrative. To claim that history 
produces ‘fact’ and ‘truth’ ignores its instability, as what was a ‘fact’ yesterday can be a 
‘fiction’ today. 
In this dissertation, I challenge the long-held notion (both in popular culture and scholarly 
discourse) that history, time, and gender are stable constructs by examining gender ambiguity 
and non-conformity in ancient Greece. The ancient world proves an excellent location for this 
exploration because it is itself ambiguous; although full of relatively familiar stories and 
images, it is spatially, culturally, and chronologically distant and alien. I focus heavily on the 
power of language, particularly anachronistic language, as a useful analytical tool. Why should 
we not apply words such as ‘transgender’ or ‘intersex’ to individuals from a culture that had 
no conception of these terms? How can anachronism expand our understanding not only of 
ancient queerness, but also of historical linearity?  
                                                          
8 See Chapter 1, 15.  
9 Combating the historical erasure of queerness “has been a crucial part of finding out about ourselves as 
contemporary [queer people] and LGBT folk. It has at times provided a sense of history to those who have found 
themselves left out of world histories that stigmatize or simply ignore gender and sexual ‘outlaws’’ or non-
conformists.” See Gibson, Meem, and Alexander 2014, 4. 
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2. QUEERING GENDER IN ANTIQUITY 
2.1. ANCIENT GREEK GENDER NON-CONFORMITY 
The world of ancient Greece was full of gender ambiguity, particularly in the creative fields of 
myth-making, art, literature, and theatre: the god Dionysos embodied both masculinity and 
femininity in his behaviour and dress; Hermaphroditos simultaneously had typically ‘male’ and 
‘female’ anatomy; Kaineus and Teiresias transitioned between genders, transformed by divine 
and magical arts; the Amazons were warrior-women excelling in traditionally masculine 
pursuits; Medeia and Klytaimnestra asserted themselves in the typically masculine public 
sphere; theatre actors and the attendees of religious festivals would often momentarily take on 
the clothing and characteristics of another gender. These ritual practices of gender ambiguity 
were merely situational and temporary, and these mythical figures were regularly regarded as 
‘others’, challengers to dominant social norms. However, non-normalised expressions of 
genders, and the blurring of boundaries between ‘male’ and ‘female’, all existed in the stories 
that the ancient world created. It is interesting that in a culture rich with such gender ambiguity, 
‘scientific’ texts – those concerned with medicine or philosophy, rather than stories or mythical 
tales directly – struggle to acknowledge it unless it refers to the world of the gods. Indeed, 
authors such as the fifth-century BCE physician Hippocrates and the first-century BCE historian 
Diodorus Siculus attempt to maintain a clear distinction between the world of humans and the 
realm of the gods, particularly when describing gender ambiguity. Although acceptable for 
divine and mythical creatures, when ‘real’ humans are ambiguous in their genders, it is treated 
as an illness and an oddity.  
Gender ambiguous and non-conforming people are regularly examined as outliers to the 
‘natural’ separation between ‘male’ and ‘female’. However, I aim to reverse this practice by 
examining, firstly, how the gender binary limits our understanding of ambiguity, and secondly, 
how we can study ambiguous beings as queer entities entirely removed from binary norms. My 
first chapter discusses terminology and methodology, beginning with an exploration of the 
division of ‘sex’ and ‘gender’ into separate concepts. This dichotomy is increasingly 
challenged by scholars, and I show that dividing these concepts not only oversimplifies them, 
but also limits our analyses of the past. I further discuss and challenge various theories on the 
function of gender in antiquity, before considering the usefulness of Queer Unhistoricism, a 
theory that defines time as non-linear and multidimensional in order to re-examine historical 
examples of queerness. 
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 In Chapters 2 and 3, I discuss two remarkably similar cases of people who would today be 
considered transgender (specifically trans men or transmasculine) and/or intersex. Phaethousa 
and Nanno (in Hippocrates), and Diophantos and Kallon (in Diodorus), are all assigned female 
at birth, but experience spontaneous ‘masculinisations’, forming exceptional examples for 
direct comparison. They are also particularly significant as they are the only two ancient Greek 
texts produced before the turn of the millennium that discuss non-mythological cases of gender 
transition. Although other texts in this period discuss gender ambiguity, change, and non-
conformity, they are most often limited to the mythological stories, or to generalised examples 
in the works of philosophers or medical writers.10    
Chapter 2 focuses on the Hippocratic case of Phaethousa and Nanno. I begin with a detailed 
examination of the author’s language, which continually dismisses their gender ambiguity by 
referring to them as merely ‘diseased women’. This perception of Phaethousa and Nanno has 
persisted in their reception, and they are frequently considered ‘problems’ that need to be 
solved. However, the application of anachronistic language, using terms such as ‘transgender’, 
‘intersex’, and ‘non-binary’, can allow Phaethousa and Nanno to regain their bodily autonomy 
and truly exist as the boundary-breaking beings that they are. In Chapter 3, I examine how 
Diophantos and Kallon become medicalised after physicians artificially reconstruct their 
bodies to conform to socially-normative ideals. Diodorus presents gender ambiguity as an 
‘error of nature’, able to be rectified by human intervention; however, although forced to 
subscribe to traditional masculinity, Diophantos and Kallon are nevertheless always considered 
somehow queer by their author and later scholars. They thus come to truly embody transgender 
and intersex experiences, part of society, but also considered different or ‘other’ at the same 
time. By expanding our narrative of historical queerness, we can not only combat the historical 
erasure of gender ambiguity, but also acknowledge the ways that arbitrary constructs like time 
and gender have limited the study of non-normalised individuals. 
                                                          
10 See Arist. GA. 746b21–747a4, 767b3–773a24, 784a6–11, Ph. 199a33–199b4; Hp. Aër. 22, Vict. (Regimen) 
1.28; Pl. Sym. 189d–193a.  
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CHAPTER 1  
GENDER AND SEX: THEORIES AND METHODOLOGIES 
If sex were simply a natural fact, we could never write its history. And then one 
of our favorite modern projects – to describe the development and periodization 
and dialectical interaction of the sex/gender systems of the varied societies we 
know – would have to be abandoned. But sex is not, except in a trivial and 
uninteresting sense, a natural fact.1 
In Before Sexuality, John Winkler profoundly questions our understanding of sex, which is 
almost inextricably tied to ideas of nature, biology, and anatomy. He destabilises our long-held 
assumptions about what is natural or cultural; sex cannot be a natural fact because it is 
influenced by cultural perceptions of ‘correctness’. Yet Winkler’s statement is contradictory 
for two reasons: firstly, his essay deals primarily with the sexual activities of ancient Greek 
men, not the physiological make-up of their bodies. Secondly, in the volume that Winkler’s 
essay appears in, Before Sexuality, the editors define sex as the “erogenous capacities and 
genital functions of the human body”, and therefore “Sex, so defined, is a natural fact”.2 
Winkler is one of those editors, and he thus appears to contradict himself. Able to refer to an 
act or to physiology, and influenced by ideas of nature and biology, ‘sex’ is clearly difficult to 
define. How then can we attempt to understand the concept of sex? More importantly, can sex 
not be a natural fact?    
 
1. SEX AND GENDER 
1.1. NATURE VS. CULTURE  
Sex and gender have typically been defined as separate concepts within a nature vs. culture 
dichotomy. According to Monique David-Ménard and Penelope Deutsche, this originated with 
Richard Stoller’s 1968 definition of gender as the ‘aspects of sexuality’ that were determined 
by culture and learned at birth, and sex as the anatomical and physiological factors that dictate 
whether one is male or female.3 As a result, sex became a stable biological entity, whereas 
gender became a cultural concept possible to theorise and deconstruct because culture itself 
                                                          
1 Winkler 1990, 171. 
2 Halperin, Winkler, and Zeitlin 1990, 3. 
3 David-Ménard and Deutscher 2014, 375. 
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was fluid and changeable.4 Judith Butler further developed this idea, arguing that gender was 
entirely produced by social and cultural practices. For Butler, gender was repeatedly realised 
and maintained in performance; it is not ‘done’ alone, but practiced with others, thus creating 
regulatory practices that govern how gender should be ‘correctly’ performed.5 Culturally-
mediated understandings of ‘masculine’ or ‘feminine’ also affect how we perform, create, and 
maintain what Butler terms “intelligible genders”, which reflect culturally-normative notions 
about how gender should physically, sexually, mentally, and socially exist. Those who do not 
follow these norms, who demonstrate discontinuity and incoherence among their various 
gender and sexual expressions, become an ‘other’; Butler, for instance, notes that individuals 
who experience same-gender attraction could be considered culturally unintelligible.6  Her 
work therefore radically repositions our thinking on gender and culture, demonstrating their 
cyclical relationship: social norms regulate how gender should be ‘correctly’ performed, and 
performance of gender perpetuates these social norms.  
Unlike gender, which could be theorised and deconstructed, sex has long been considered a 
stable entity separate from culture and belonging purely to the world of biology and ‘nature’. 
However, sex itself has a history, which in turn places it within a cultural and social context. 
Certainly, ‘facts’ about sex are often produced to serve the political or cultural interests of a 
particular society and time. As Thomas Laqueur notes, sex is “situational” because “no one 
was much interested in looking for evidence of two distinct sexes, [and] the anatomical and 
concrete physiological differences between men and women, until such differences became 
politically important.”7 This definition of sex as a differentiator between two stable categories 
– male or female based on physiological characteristics – is open to change depending on 
cultural evolution. Even the biological grounding of sex, the fact it is based on supposedly 
stable and ‘natural’ biological features, is situational. Sex can be determined by various 
combinations of anatomical, hormonal, and/or chromosomal factors, which can all be altered 
by both natural and human intervention.8 Sex therefore has a history and it has cultural framing, 
becoming just as unstable as gender.  
                                                          
4 This separation allowed early feminist scholars and activists to negate claims about women’s supposed 
‘inferiority’ to men based on ‘natural’ anatomical, and physical characteristics. See Butler 1999, 9–10; Evans 
2011, 605; Holmes 2012, 3. 
5 Butler 1999, 25–33; Butler 2004, 1. 
6 Butler 1999, 22–24, 147. 
7 Laqueur 1990, 10–11. See also Butler 1999, 10–12, 23–24; David-Ménard and Deutscher 2014, 376; Eckert 
2003, 3; Epstein 1990, 101. 
8 See Chapter 3, 45–50.  
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If the immutable character of sex [can be thus] contested, perhaps this construct 
called ‘sex’ is as culturally constructed as gender; indeed, perhaps it was always 
already gender, with the consequence that the distinction between sex and 
gender turns out to be no distinction at all.9 
As Butler notes, gender and sex cannot be defined as separate concepts.10 ‘Gender’ can be 
employed to describe concepts relating to the organisation of society, biology, and culture 
according to the binary of masculine and feminine. Our understanding of gender, either as a 
concept or on an individual level, can therefore be influenced by various factors including the 
anatomical, biological, mental, cultural, or social aspects of a lived experience; it is this very 
broad definition of gender that I will employ, one that does not separate ‘gender’ and ‘sex’.  
 
1.2. ‘THE BODY’ 
Without the dichotomy of gender and sex, we can critically examine the complex ways culture 
and biology influence the body, which is itself a concept with multiple applications. It can be 
understood as the physical form of a single person in a moment of time. As Mireille Lee notes, 
a person’s body forms the boundary between the self and society, and therefore, every 
individual human body is subject to culturally-mediated norms that influence how it is shaped, 
maintained, and socially interpreted.11 Thus, cultural constructions of ‘intelligible’ gender 
directly influence a person’s physical form, and therefore the body becomes a means of 
reinforcing and adhering to cultural gender intelligibility. However, neither social norms nor 
bodily boundaries are fixed; society evolves over time and redefines its stance on ‘correctness’, 
‘naturalness’, or ‘normality’; likewise, the body can be significantly modified in various 
permanent and temporary ways. Thus, the body cannot be considered a stable entity, but rather 
a fluid form reflecting, or even challenging, social norms.   
Rather than focusing on the individual physical form, Laqueur conversely, examines two 
different conceptions of ‘the body’. Firstly, the body can be a transcultural phenomenon, a 
physical human form recognisable to a variety of cultures and across time. Secondly, the body 
can be theorised by various groups working within the cultural context of their time. Laqueur 
                                                          
9 Butler 1999, 10–11. 
10 If I need to emphasise a physical/biological expression of gender, I will refer to ‘the body’ or ‘physical gender’. 
Cf. Eckert 2003, 3. 
11 Lee 2009, 156. 
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thus wishes to distinguish between the body as a transcultural (and transchronological) concept, 
and the body as discursively-produced and dependent on specific cultural contexts. However, 
this is perhaps too simplistic. As Gloria Ferrari notes, scholars have begun to reconsider this 
division, arguing that the body should instead be understood as multiple ‘bodies’.12 There can 
be physical, cultural, discursive, and ahistorical bodies that may or may not be transcultural. 
For instance, Lin Foxhall states that “[men] and women in the past looked physically ‘male’ 
and ‘female’, in the same basic ways as we do today” and therefore, the materiality of the body 
links us to the past.13 But this is impossible to establish. When examining other cultures and 
time periods, we can to a certain extent recognise a body as human, but every single culture in 
any time period would have varying conceptions of what makes a body human. There can thus 
never truly be a transcultural body because ‘human’ itself is a discursive and socially-mediated 
category.14 Just like gender, the body can be understood as an individual lived experience, a 
biological concept, and a culturally-mediated idea all at the same time. Gender can be inscribed 
on the body and vice versa, creating and maintaining social norms that can change when applied 
to different cultures and time periods.  
 
2. GENDER IN ANTIQUITY 
2.1. CONCEPTUALISING GENDER IN ANTIQUITY 
The ancient Greeks did not have the same understanding of gender that we have today, and did 
not necessarily subscribe to the debated ‘nature vs. culture’ dichotomy of gender; however, as 
Brooke Holmes notes, they still questioned what constitutes male and female, masculinity and 
femininity.15 Male citizens in ancient Greece occupied the highest social stratum and played 
an active role in political and social life; striving for intellectual excellence and philosophical 
elevation all became associated with a masculine ideal. Physically, possessing a penis, testes, 
body hair, and facial hair was associated with masculinity and tied to concepts of masculine 
strength.16  Thus the boundaries of male and female were structured around particular socially-
mediated roles and physical expressions. People who moved between or beyond those 
                                                          
12 Ferrari 2009, 4. 
13 Foxhall 2013, 3. 
14 On the conflation between intersex natures and ‘monstrosity’ (i.e. non-humanness) see Chapter 3, 50–52. 
15 Holmes 2012, 1–2.  
16 See Chapters 2 and 3; Arist. HA 489a10–14, 493a25, 518a33–35; Arist. GA 716a4–b1, 718a11–15, 727a16–19, 
728b26–27, 783b18–784a12; Hp. Nat.Puer. 9;  Dean-Jones 1994, 134; Dover 1974, 96–99; Holmes 2012, 15, 44; 
Jones 1987, 63–72, 84–94; Kent 2006, 86–89; Laqueur 1990, 28–30. 
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boundaries were demonised as ‘other’.17 Phaethousa, Nanno, Diophantos, and Kallon – 
discussed at length in the following chapters – are all assigned female at birth, but begin to take 
on physical features (Diophantos and Kallon also take on social characteristics) typically 
considered ‘male’, and they are immediately ‘othered’ as a result. 
The four cases that I will discuss all clearly demonstrate that physical bodies and social 
standing could be relatively fluid in ancient Greece, existing in a different framework to our 
own. Thomas Laqueur, for instance, argues that a two-sex model of the body has existed since 
the eighteenth century CE, which designates two completely separate and different types of 
bodies, male and female. Prior to that, conversely, there was only a one-sex model in which 
women were seen as men turned inside out.18 The body was thus fluid and open to change. 
Maud Gleason similarly notes that gender in the ancient world was seen as something that 
needs to be physically and mentally moulded onto a body – in many cases quite literally, with 
certain practices for swaddling, massaging, and squeezing babies into desirable ‘masculine’ 
and ‘feminine’ shapes.19 Thus, both Gleason and Laqueur highlight the fluidity of the body; 
depending on education and physical moulding, one’s body could shift into maleness or 
femaleness relatively easily. 
Conceivably then, this type of ‘sliding-scale’ model of gender existed in antiquity, rather than 
our model based on gender difference. Holmes and Helen King both highlight several texts in 
the Hippocratic Corpus and Aristotle’s works supporting this idea. The Hippocratic text 
Regimen 1, for example, designates three kinds of men and three kinds of women, each 
corresponding to a different degree of ‘maleness’ or ‘femaleness’ resulting from various 
combinations of ‘seed’ from both parents at conception. In Generation of Animals, Aristotle 
argued that men could ‘lose masculinity’ and descend into ‘undesirable’ femininity; for 
example, a castrated man would become ‘like a woman’.20 Moreover, as Gleason and Holmes 
both note, gender in antiquity needed to be performed and maintained through diet, exercise, 
intellectual pursuits, and social conduct. If a man did not maintain a ‘masculine’ diet, good 
level of exercise, challenge himself intellectually, and conduct himself socially as a masculine 
                                                          
17 See Introduction p.4. This also included kinaidoi (men who preferred a passive role in same-gender intercourse), 
androgynoi (seen as ‘male-bodied’ but feminine in every other way), eunuchs, and intersex people. See duBois 
1991, 111–117, 119–122; Foxhall 2013, 80–84, 89; Gleason 1990, 394–398; Holmes 2012, 76–79; Rowlands 
2014, 41; Winkler 1990, 176–186. 
18 Laqueur 1990, 8, 4–11. 
19 Gleason 1990, 392–394, 402–406. 
20 See Hp. Vict. (Regimen) 1.28–29; Arist. GA 766a27–28; Holmes 2012, 28–44; King 1998, 7–11. 
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man – paying attention to the way he spoke, walked, or engaged in sexual activities – his gender 
could become suspect, and his body and social standing could ‘descend’ into the realms of 
unacceptable femininity.21  
This sliding-scale model can account for the physical and social fluidity of gender in the ancient 
world, but it does not acknowledge its remarkably fixed nature. Aristotle, for instance, argues 
that a eunuch is ‘like a woman’, but will never actually ‘be’ a woman. Similarly, he states that 
women can never truly build up enough internal body heat to become a man, who were 
typically considered warmer than women.22 It seems that bodies in the ancient world were not 
thought of as truly fluid and existing on a continuum. Indeed, apart from the sliding-scale 
model, King tracks two other possible frameworks of gender in antiquity: firstly, one in which 
women are entirely inferior to men – noticeable in Aristotle’s claim that a woman can never 
become a man and demonstrated by Laqueur’s statement that women were seen as inversed 
men – and secondly, a model similar to ours that saw women as entirely different to men. 
Supporting this last option, King notes that women’s diseases were considered so different 
from men’s to require the entirely separate medical field of gynaecology.23  
It is difficult to determine an all-encompassing theory of gender in antiquity not only because 
of the contradictory nature of our extant evidence, but also because, as Foxhall points out: 
we cannot detach ourselves from gender as we live it ourselves in our own time 
and place, [meaning] that we must always be interpreting gender in the past 
through the filter of our own present, however hard we try to be scholarly and 
objective.24 
This leaves us in a conundrum. Our ideas about gender difference, the still-pervasive notions 
about gender as divided into two separate concepts (nature and culture) that I discussed earlier 
– particularly the notion that biology puts forward ahistorical, ‘natural’ truths about gender – 
constantly influence our readings of ancient texts. How then can we try to conceptualise gender 
in the past if we cannot leave aside the present? The solution should surely be to leave aside 
our modern assumptions of culture, nature, and biology, and attempt to see how gender 
functions outside of those constraints. 
                                                          
21 Gleason 1990, 392–406; Holmes 2012, 79–81, 110–128. 
22 Arist GA 728a17–25, 746b33–747a4, 775a14–20. See also Holmes 2012, 44. 
23 King 1998, 11. 
24 Foxhall 2013, 4 
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2.2. BROOKE HOLMES: THROW OUT YOUR CULTURAL BIASES 
Holmes proposes a different theory, which synthesises elements of King’s three possible 
models for gender in antiquity. Examining ancient stories of physical fluidity, social variability, 
and various practices that existed to maintain intelligible genders, Holmes concludes that 
although gender was remarkably changeable, the ancients did not believe in a fully fluid, one-
sex body as Laqueur suggests. She also emphasises that gender operated in often highly 
constrictive ways in the ancient world, reinforcing cultural norms and constraining how 
individuals expressed themselves in their physicality, clothing, voice, interests, and their 
perception of others. To truly have an understanding of gender, therefore, we would have to 
acknowledge that all three models outlined by King existed simultaneously: fluidity, sexual 
difference, and patriarchal hierarchy. We would also need to acknowledge the fragmentary 
nature of our sources, the variety and plurality of meanings, and the range of different 
experiences over time. As Holmes says, this is perhaps too much information to retain all at 
once.25 
Holmes therefore proposes an almost all-encompassing theory, interpreting gender in the 
ancient world as something that was simultaneously fixed and fluid; it existed on a continuum 
on which – although able to move – maleness and femaleness were more-or-less fixed. 
Certainly, Holmes’ theory allows enough variation to be comfortably applied to just about 
every ancient Greek or Roman text that deals with gender. Indeed, the stories of Phaethousa, 
Nanno, Diophantos, and Kallon discussed in the following chapters all demonstrate this fixed 
yet fluid model, with bodies and social expressions of gender simultaneously open to change 
but also more-or-less fixed. Yet Holmes’ model is not without its problems. She directly 
acknowledges that her references to ‘the ancients’ is problematic, using it as an overly 
simplistic blanket term to describe a world that spanned vast time periods (prehistory to the 
early medieval period), space (Britain to India), and political organisations (democracy to 
monarchy).26 Thus, we could never truly have a theory of gender in antiquity that is all-
encompassing, applicable to these diverse places, periods, and cultures that would have 
changed over time. Her theory therefore appears applicable to just about any ancient text 
precisely because it is designed to be suitable to such a vast area, and therefore it cannot be 
specific when it deals with such diverse temporal and cultural contexts. 
                                                          
25 Holmes 2012, 25. 
26 Holmes 2012, 7, 11–13. 
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2.3. THE SECOND PROBLEM WITH HOLMES’ THEORY: A NOTE ON LANGUAGE 
Leslie Feinberg addresses an important issue in hir book Transgender Warriors:27 
We have a history filled with militant hero/ines. Yet therein lies the rub! How 
can I tell you about their battles when the words woman and man, feminine and 
masculine, are almost the only words that exist in the English language to 
describe all the vicissitudes of bodies and styles of expression?28 
Zie thus points out one of the biggest limitations in the study of gender; it is binary, splitting 
the world into men and women, male and female, whereas ambiguity is seen as an outlier. 
Scholars, including Holmes, always start from the assumption that maleness and femaleness 
constitute two stable categories, and that anyone who does not conform to socially-normative 
views of binary gender – regardless of the period of analysis – is automatically an ‘other’ or a 
‘non-conformer’.29 As Feinberg thus points out, language itself is limiting, affecting not only 
our verbal expressions but also our capacity to imagine anything outside of binary gender 
norms. 
In more recent years, new terminology has evolved, which is capable of describing a vast range 
of different gender experiences. Susan Stryker particularly examines the term 
‘transgender/trans’, which by the 1990s gained the definition it retains today: an umbrella term 
referring to anyone who does not strictly identify with the gender they were assigned at birth. 
It can thus encompass any kind of variation from binary gender norms and expectations.30 
Other terms have also arisen including non-binary (people whose gender identity is not 
exclusively male or female), which also comes under the banner of ‘trans’, as well as intersex 
(people whose bodies – including any chromosomal, hormonal, and/or anatomical features – 
do not fit into traditional definitions of ‘male body’ or ‘female body’).31 These terms were 
created due to the gap in our language, and consequently our understanding, of gender 
ambiguity. However, despite their necessary evolution, they are nevertheless mediated by the 
gender binary. Notice that each definition could only be written by referring to binary gender; 
we still need to use the words ‘man’ or ‘woman’, ‘masculine’ or ‘feminine’ to define them. 
Nevertheless, although limited by social norms, this new language provides us with an 
                                                          
27 I use Feinberg’s preferred pronouns zie/hir rather than she/her or he/him. 
28 Feinberg 1996, ix.  
29 See Eckert 2003, 3–6. 
30 Stryker 2017, 36. I will use transgender’ and ‘trans’ interchangeably. ‘Trans’, ‘intersex’, and ‘non-binary’ are 
all adjectives not nouns. 
31 This is not an exhaustive list and new terms are constantly arising. See glossary in Stryker 2017, 10–44. 
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expanded vocabulary beyond a simple binary division, and can thus expand our understanding 
of gender ambiguity.  
Scholars of antiquity tend to shy away from this new terminology, even when discussing 
ambiguity – instances where this language could be incredibly useful – claiming it is 
anachronistic. Interestingly, words like ‘sex’ and ‘gender’ describe modern concepts that would 
be alien to the ancient world, despite the fact that they derive from ancient Greek and Latin 
roots.32 It is more noteworthy, therefore, that scholars of antiquity including Holmes continue 
to use these words, whose application to the ancient world would also be anachronistic. There 
is a difference here. Where ‘sex’ and ‘gender’ (and their separation) are widely accepted words 
that uphold and maintain social norms, words like ‘trans’, ‘intersex’, and ‘non-binary’ are seen 
to belong to a minority community who question and challenge social normativity.33 
This is the other main issue with Holmes’ theory. She claims that her model does away with 
the binaries of sex and gender, as well as male and female. Although her theory largely 
collapses the modern distinction between ‘sex’ and ‘gender’ – if both concepts are fixed and 
fluid, claims about an inherent difference between ‘natural’ and ‘cultural’ is negated – and she 
acknowledges it is inappropriate to apply these terms to the ancient world, she nevertheless 
uses them. Her theory can only dissolve this binary to a certain extent, largely because she still 
retains these terms with their inherent culturally-loaded meanings. It would have been far more 
radical to truly collapse their meanings, and thus acknowledge the many applications of gender, 
including physical, social, cultural, mental, and personal. Furthermore, the binary of male and 
female lies at the core of her theory: maleness and femaleness remain more-or-less fixed at 
either end of her continuum. She thus examines ancient conceptions of gender in a way that is 
not especially nuanced, from the perspective of seeing how the ‘abnormal’, ‘ambiguous’, or 
‘non-conforming’ person can complicate a strict separation between male and female. In these 
types of analyses, the ‘non-conformer’ presents a problem for binary gender. Instead, it would 
be far more interesting to examine how maleness and femaleness – that is to say, social norms 
dictating that only two ‘intelligible’ genders exist – complicate our understanding of ‘non-
conformity’. What would be the advantage of examining the ‘other’ not just as a complication 
to binary gender norms, but as queer entities unbound by the strictures of gender dualism?   
                                                          
32 In Latin, ‘sexus’ and ‘genus’, as well as ancient Greek ‘γένος’ (genos) could be used to talk about maleness 
and femaleness, masculinity and femininity in a very general sense. The words evolved into contemporary ‘sex’ 
and ‘gender’, but they had very different meanings in antiquity. See Holmes 2012, 10. 
33 See Chapter 2, 29–38.  
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3. QUEER APPROACHES  
3.1. QUEER STUDIES AND GENDER-DIVERSITY 
The question of language has plagued the field of Queer Studies since its inception. Michel 
Foucault, whose famous three-volume text The History of Sexuality spearheaded the discipline, 
argued that homosexuality (and indeed sexuality as some type of personal identity closely 
linked to one’s idea of ‘the self’) did not exist before the nineteenth century. Therefore, he 
states, we cannot use the term to describe any events or people before then.34 Studies of queer 
history were fraught with debates about whether it was appropriate to use the terms 
‘homosexual’ or ‘homosexual desire’ at all. Indeed, David Halperin notes  
I didn’t have a language for articulating systematically the discontinuities 
between ancient Greek sexual attitudes or practices and my own. Or, at least, I 
didn’t have such a language until the mid-1980s when it was provided me by 
[…] the work of social constructionist historians of homosexuality.35 
This social constructionist view of history dictates that scholars must be aware of the social 
and historical context of the period they are studying; thus, it is incorrect to speak of 
homosexuality or homosexual desire in ancient Greece when they supposedly had no such 
concept, only the notion of active and passive roles in sexual intercourse. Language thus 
becomes a point of contention. In this framework, queer scholars cannot claim to be studying 
the history of homosexuality unless it is a history that begins in the nineteenth century.  
How then do we talk about a concept we can trace, but that has different or no terminology? 
Indeed, nineteenth- and twentieth-century explorations of sexuality tended to group together 
trans people and those who experienced same-gender love. The nineteenth-century scholar Karl 
Heinrich Ulrichs formed a biologically-inclined theory of ‘Urnings’, people like himself who 
practiced male same-gender love. He described them as ‘anima muliebris virili corpore 
inclusa’, a female soul enclosed in a male body. Same-gender love was thus coupled with 
gender non-conformity.36 Magnus Hirschfeld, an early pioneer of the queer rights movement 
who established the first ‘sexology’ institute in 1919, considered trans and same-gender loving 
people to exist as ‘sexual intermediaries’ on a spectrum from a hypothetical ‘pure male’ to 
                                                          
34 Foucault 1984, 43; Gibson, Meem, and Alexander 2014, 3; Halperin 1990, 6–7, 24–36, 64–65. Cf. Champagne 
2013, 1005–1006. 
35 Halperin 2004, 3.  
36 Halperin 1990, 4; Stryker 2017, 52–53. 
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‘pure female’.37 Thus, from this early stage, queer gender was not separated from queer sexual 
desire. Both were seen as ultimately ‘other’ when compared to normalised conceptions of 
gender and sexuality.38  
 
3.2. QUEER UNHISTORICISM 
As Elizabeth Freeman notes, early Queer Theory predominantly centred on the concept of the 
avant-garde, which posited the past as the ‘other’ of the present – just as queer sexuality was 
the ‘other’ of normative sexual practices.39 This theoretical framework insisted that historical 
context be understood and observed when studying the past. In this altericist and historicist 
system, anachronism becomes a problem because it removes historical distance and disregards 
historical context, collapsing past and present.40 As a result, the concept of history as something 
different to and removed from the present is abandoned. However, what Sarah Ferguson calls 
the “deconstructive turn” – the critical trend arguing that texts are always already severed from 
their context and that no historical context can guarantee any kind of stability of meaning – 
began to radically critique the ‘text of history’.41 It is this trend that prompted queer scholars 
to question not only “a historicism that proposes to know the definitive difference between the 
past and the present”, but also culturally-created structures such as history, sexuality, time, and 
gender.42  
In particular, recent movements in Queer Theory turns to the “free-floating, endlessly mobile, 
and infinitely subversive capacities” of the term ‘queer’ to radically question the nature of 
history as a dominant narrative that privileges the perspectives of the powerful.43 In particular, 
Queer Unhistoricism thoroughly upsets traditional, linear historical narratives by asking: if we 
are studying people who were perceived to be out of place in historical societies, why then 
should they be bound by traditional history? Initially termed ‘homo-history’ by its earliest 
proponents Jonathan Goldberg and Madhavi Menon, they sought to ‘queer’ history and stated 
                                                          
37 Halperin, Winkler, and Zeitlin 1990, 11–12; Hirschfeld 2006, 28–29, 34–39; Stryker 2017, 54–55. 
38 Queer Theory itself formed around an idea of the transgender figure. Trans people were seen as crossing 
boundaries of gender and sexuality, just like Queer Theory traversed different methodologies and identities. See 
Prosser 2006, 258–259. 
39 Freeman 2010, xiii. See also Goldberg and Menon 2005, 1608–1609; Matzner 2016, 181; Prosser 2006, 258–
261; Traub 2013, 21. 
40 Bevir 2011, 25–26; Jardine 2000, 251–252. 
41 Dinshaw et al. 2007, 185; Schmitz 2007, 160. 
42 Goldberg and Menon 2005, 1609. 
43 Traub 2013, 33. 
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that “Far from being ahistorical – or somehow outside history – unhistoricism would 
acknowledge that history as it is hegemonically understood today is inadequate [for] housing 
the project of queering […].”44 Because queer individuals have largely been erased from 
history, Queer Unhistoricism seeks to not only expand the narrative of their pasts, but also to 
re-examine history itself. It therefore re-interprets culturally-normative perceptions of time. 
Time is usually thought of as having clearly defined beginning and end points, with people 
experiencing birth, adolescence, reproduction, and death along a particular, linear, culturally-
imposed timeline; conversely, as Jack Halberstam notes, a queer individual’s experience of 
time (including puberty, procreation, and death) takes place in a different manner to the 
normative model, in an alternative temporality.45 Queer Time is therefore non-linear, fluid, and 
multi-dimensional.46 When this concept of queer, non-linear time is applied to historical 
periods, anachronism becomes a useful tool to expand our understanding of people who did 
not occupy gender or sexual norms of their time.  
Many unhistoricist scholars such as Madhavi Menon, Jonathan Goldberg, Carla Freccero, and 
Carolyn Dinshaw focus on queering periods other than the ancient world, and they examine 
same-gender desire rather than non-normalised genders. Nevertheless, Queer Unhistoricism 
provides an excellent opportunity to critically examine the histories of transgender and intersex 
people. The ancient world is a particularly potent place to locate such a discussion about time 
and history. Whenever we study Classics, we are dealing with only a limited number of texts 
from a vast body of now lost or fragmentary works, and these texts will have survived centuries 
of copy mistakes, translation, editing, and damages. As a result, no scholar of antiquity can say 
with certainty that the words we read truly are the words written by an ancient author, nor can 
we confirm exactly where, when, and by whom they were composed. Classical texts in their 
very nature are thus fragmentary, and have a complex relationship with time, simultaneously 
existing both inside linear time (e.g. Plato wrote before Aristotle), and outside linear time 
(Aristotle’s works may have informed the way Plato was commented on, understood, and even 
preserved) – and perhaps even more interestingly, they have continued to influence scholarship 
for centuries (Aristotle and Plato informed and continue to play a role in Western philosophy). 
The ancient world thus exists simultaneously in the past and the present. 
                                                          
44 Goldberg and Menon 2005, 1609. 
45 Halberstam 2005, 175. 
46 See Dinshaw et al. 2007, 178–183, 186–187, 193; Freeman 2010, 3–7; Halberstam 2005, 2–4; Traub 2013, 22. 
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Moreover, terms used to denote identities that fall under the banner of queer, such as 
‘transgender’, ‘intersex’, and ‘homosexual’, all derive from Greek and Latin roots. They are 
thus simultaneously ancient and modern, both are and are not anachronistic. Furthermore, 
Classics always recognised its intersex history, best exemplified by the deity Hermaphroditos, 
whose name evolved into the now out-dated term ‘hermaphrodite’ and ‘hermaphroditism’. The 
simple fact that language has changed, ‘hermaphrodite’ now largely abandoned in favour of 
‘intersex’, is itself an example of the artificiality of history and its ability to be changed and 
shaped over time. History is thus culturally constructed, and able to be changed and shaped 
over time. Queer Unhistoricism can therefore help us uncover hidden histories, ones that 
require a new perspective, which may not have been available to previous scholars. It 
challenges deeply entrenched ideas about history as progressive and linear. Likewise 
transgender and intersex figures present a challenge to dominant modes of thought in which 
‘male’ and ‘female’, ‘man’ and ‘woman’ are  naturally – rather than socially – constructed 
ideas. 
 
4. CONCLUSION: QUEERING GENDER 
Despite the fact that gender has typically been divided into its cultural aspects (gender) and 
biological expressions (sex), scholarship is beginning to recognise that this is too simplistic. 
Gender in all its applications – physical, social, mental, personal – has been conceptualised and 
controlled in different ways throughout history, making its study, separated from contemporary 
biases, very difficult. However, despite arguments and assumptions that the ancient Greeks 
were so different from us today, scholars so often impose modern binaries of gender and a 
division of ‘natural vs. cultural’ onto ancient societies, unable to see beyond these deeply-
ingrained cultural constructs. Queer ways of examining the world and re-thinking time can 
perhaps move us beyond this. Conceptually, gender is culturally locked into a linear timeline 
considered ‘normal’. However, when we consider that social norms are fluid, then the bodies 
and minds they are imposed on likewise adopt this fluidity. Change, fluidity, and ambiguity 
have the potential to further our understanding of gender, both today and in the ancient world, 
and also strongly indicate the arbitrary nature of human constructs. Furthermore, a queer 
unhistoricist examination of the world can help us fully understand that ambiguity – the ‘grey 
area’ between the two traditional genders, a space typically regarded as unstable and transient 




PROBLEMS OF LANGUAGE: HIPPOCRATES’ ‘WOMEN’ 
The grey area, I’d discovered, had been misnamed: really the grey area was a 
whole other spectrum of colours new to the eye. […] She was so boyish it was 
girlish, so girlish it was boyish, she made me want to rove the world writing our 
names on every tree.1 
Gender is often thought to exist on a spectrum with masculinity and femininity at either end, 
and the space in between – the grey area – as the ambiguous mid-point. In Ali Smith’s 2007 
novel Girl meets boy, Robin Goodman is the boyish girl and the girlish boy, embodying a 
complete confusion of gender norms, and living entirely on a “whole other spectrum of 
colours”. As Smith suggests, gender is far more complex than a simple spectrum, and gender 
ambiguity is a space far richer and wider-ranging than merely the ‘grey area’ between 
masculinity and femininity. However, despite Smith’s attempts to present Robin as the ‘girlish 
boy and boyish girl’, and despite the gender ambiguity and fluidity in the novel, Robin 
Goodman is still ‘she’. Smith still choses to define her ambiguous character by referring to the 
gender binary; the “whole other spectrum of colours” thus becomes collapsed into the single 
simplified spectrum of masculinity-ambiguity-femininity. Robin is nevertheless bound by the 
strictures of an unshakeable gender binary that, despite evidence to the contrary, firmly dictates 
that anyone who exists in society must always occupy one gender or the other. 
In Epidemics, the ancient Greek ‘father’ of medicine Hippocrates tells the story of two people 
who find themselves in a similar position. Phaethousa and Nanno are both assigned female at 
birth, but later in life their bodies spontaneously start to be ‘masculinised’. They reach a mid-
point, neither masculine nor feminine, male nor female, and are subsequently subjected to the 
controlling powers of physicians who attempt to reverse these changes. In theory, much like 
Robin, they could find solace on the “whole other spectrum of colours”; however, just like their 
modern counterpart, Phaethousa’s and Nanno’s ambiguity is underscored by their unshakeable 
designation as ‘women’. Because they exist in an ambiguous state, impossible to define using 
our simplistic binary terms, language itself also controls and limits not only how we describe 
them but also our capacity to imagine the endless variability of gender. In the Hippocratic story, 
                                                          
1 Smith 2007, 83–84. 
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ambiguity becomes not a fascinating area that explores the rigidness of gender norms (as 
Robin’s character does), but an unstable force that must be controlled and removed. 
 
1. HIPPOCRATES 
1.1 EPIDEMICS: PHAETHOUSA AND NANNO 
Hippocrates of Kos was a prominent ancient Greek physician active during the fifth century 
BCE, under whose name numerous medical writings have been collected in the Hippocratic 
Corpus. However, we cannot be sure that he wrote all or indeed any treatises in the collection, 
(hence I refer to the ‘Hippocratic author’ not ‘Hippocrates’). Therefore scholars since antiquity 
have typically attributed Hippocratic texts to either Hippocrates’ own medical school on Kos, 
or the neighbouring school on the island of Knidos.2 Although the seven books of Epidemics 
are usually attributed to the Koan school, Wesley Smith argues that this practice is based purely 
on an “unreliable tradition”, and not on any concrete evidence.3 The authorship of Epidemics 
thus remains a mystery. Additionally, the treatise is dated somewhere between the late fifth 
and early third centuries BCE, based on two factors: the approximate date of Book 1, and the 
highly similar viewpoints and assumptions shared across all seven books.4 Therefore 
Epidemics itself becomes relatively ambiguous, with only an approximate date and an unknown 
author.  
The case of Phaethousa and Nanno appears in Book 6 of Epidemics, which is a collection of 
physicians’ notes primarily concerned with body organisation and the communication systems 
between different parts of the body.5 It is fitting, therefore, that an example of physical 
ambiguity is recorded here, because such an event thoroughly complicates how the body is 
organised on both an individual and societal level. This relatively short account states that: 
Ἐν Ἀβδήροις Φαέθουσα ἡ Πυθέου γυνὴ οἰκουρὸς, ἐπίτοκος ἐοῦσα τοῦ 
ἔμπροσθεν χρόνου, τοῦ δὲ ἀνδρὸς αὐτῆς φυγόντος, τὰ γυναικεῖα 
ἀπελήφθη χρόνον πουλύν· μετὰ δὲ, ἐς ἄρθρα πόνοι καὶ ἐρυθήματα· 
                                                          
2 Jouanna 1999, 58–70; Phillips 1973, 28–37. 
3 Smith 1994, 10. 
4 Smith 1994, 1, 10. 
5 Book 6 was likely made in preparation for revising Books 1 and 3, the most cohesive and well-known books of 
Epidemics. Books 1 and 3 deal with descriptions of the weather and the diseases they cause (called catastases); 
Books 5 and 7 are collections of case histories. See Smith 1994, 1–2, 6–10. 
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τούτων δὲ ξυμβάντων, τό τε σῶμα ἠνδρώθη, καὶ ἐδασύνθη πάντα, 
καὶ πώγωνα ἔφυσε, καὶ φωνὴ τρηχέη ἐγενήθη, καὶ πάντα 
πραγματευσαμένων ἡμῶν ὅσα ἦν πρὸς τὸ τὰ γυναικεῖα 
κατασπάσαι, οὐκ ἦλθεν, ἀλλ’ ἀπέθανεν, οὐ πουλὺν μετέπειτα 
χρόνον βιώσασα. Ξυνέβη δὲ καὶ Ναννοῖ τῇ Γοργίππου γυναικὶ ἐν 
Θάσῳ τωὐτό· ἐδόκει δὲ πᾶσι τοῖσιν ἰητροῖσιν, οἷσι κἀγὼ ἐνέτυχον, μία 
ἐλπὶς εἶναι τοῦ γυναικωθῆναι, εἰ τὰ κατὰ φύσιν ἔλθοι· ἀλλὰ καὶ 
ταύτῃ οὐκ ἠδυνήθη, πάντα ποιούντων, ἐπελθεῖν, ἀλλ’ ἐτελεύτησεν 
οὐ βραδέως. 
In Abdera, Phaethousa the wife of Pytheas and mistress of the house, having 
already borne her children and after her husband fled (φυγόντος), stopped 
menstruating (τὰ γυναικεῖα ἀπελήφθη) for a long time. After that, she 
experienced pain and inflammation in her joints. When all that had happened, 
her body became masculinised (ἠνδρώθη): she grew hair all over, grew a 
beard, her voice became rough, and although we tried everything to restart her 
menstrual cycle, it did not come, and Phaethousa died shortly after. The same 
thing happened to Nanno the wife of Gorgippos, in Thasos. It seemed to all the 
physicians who I met, that there was one hope of feminising (γυναικωθῆναι) 
her, if her menses would return (εἰ τὰ κατὰ φύσιν ἔλθοι). But in her case 
also (ἀλλὰ καὶ ταύτῃ οὐκ ἠδυνήθη), it was not possible, and having tried 
everything, she died quickly (6.8.32).6   
In both cases, ambiguity comes to dominate a previously clear situation; Phaethousa and Nanno 
were considered by all accounts to be female, existing in a stable state until a natural, 
spontaneous change pushed their physical bodies into instability and ambiguity, not quite 
female and not quite male.  
 
 
                                                          
6 Greek text from Smith 1994. All translations are my own unless specified otherwise. 
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2. LIMINAL BEINGS 
2.1. THE LANGUAGE OF AMBIGUITY 
How can the Hippocratic author attempt to describe the changes Phaethousa and Nanno 
undergo, this strange and spontaneous natural change into ambiguity that seems to have no cure 
and no precedent worth mentioning? The ancient Greeks did have specific words that could 
denote gender ambiguity, including ‘ἀνδρόγυνος’ (androgynos) or ‘ἑρμαφρόδιτος’ 
(hermaphroditos); however, neither of these words was regularly used to describe a person 
assigned female at birth, and this is reflected in their translations. Androgynos is translated as 
“a man-woman, hermaphrodite [intersex person], womanish man, or effeminate person” and is 
only used once in the Hippocratic Corpus.7 Conversely, hermaphroditos is only used twice 
prior to the third century BCE (the period Epidemics was written) to refer to an effeminate man 
and also the intersex deity Hermaphroditos.8 Therefore, although certain words did exist to 
describe situations of ambiguous gender, they do not appear to have been suitable or even 
applicable options. How then can he describe the changes Phaethousa and Nanno undergo? 
Phaethousa, for instance, quite literally begins to lose her femininity. The Hippocratic author 
states that “τὰ γυναικεῖα ἀπελήφθη” (her menses were taken away).9 He chooses the term 
‘τὰ γυναικεῖα’ (ta gynaikeia) to describe menstruation, which comes from the adjective 
‘γυναικεῖος’ (gynaikeios), meaning “feminine, belonging to women, womanly, 
effeminate.”10 It has a wide variety of applications to denote any aspect or feature perceived to 
be feminine in any way; used substantively, as in Epidemics 6.8.32, it can refer to menstruation. 
As Lesley Dean-Jones notes, menstruation was an experience considered so inextricable from 
womanhood in ancient Greece that sixth/fifth century BCE Pre-Socratic philosophers, as well 
as Hippocratic authors and Aristotle, used it as evidence of women’s supposed inferiority to 
men.11 Helen King notes that the Hippocratic author had another option, one that she 
                                                          
7 LSJ Online ‘ἀνδρόγυνος’, ἑρμαφρόδιτος’. In Regimen, the author designates three possible types of men 
resulting from the combination of different types of parental seed during conception: 1) a man of the highest 
degree, strong in body and soul, 2) a brave man with a combination of weaker and stronger elements, or 3) an 
androgynos, the lowest type of man (Hp. Vict. (Regimen) 1.28).  
8 Hesiod (fr. 194; eighth/seventh century BCE) states that Pleisthenes, husband of Aerope, was either a 
hermaphroditos or crippled; Clearchus (fr. 86; fourth/third century BCE) refers to Hermaphroditos.  
9 In the passive, the verb ‘ἀπελήφθη’ (apelēphthē) usually means ‘to be cut off/intercepted’, and does not appear 
to have any particular connotation of violent removal. Instead, it suggests that this was done (or happened) to 
Phaethousa and that she had no control over the situation. See LSJ Online ‘ἀπολαμβάνω’. 
10 LSJ Online ‘γυναικεῖος’. 
11 Dean-Jones 2003, 187–189; Jones 1987, 61–62, 72–73. 
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specifically identifies as the more common term: ‘τὰ καταμήνια’ (ta katamēnia; the 
monthlies), which would stress the regularity of menstruation.12 In the Hippocratic Corpus, ta 
katamēnia is used 112 times to refer to menstruation, and ta gynaikeia only slightly less at 78 
times; but in Epidemics itself, ta gynaikeia is just as common as ta katamēnia. The very regular 
use of ta gynaikeia, especially in Epidemics, would therefore suggest that the words were 
largely interchangeable, particularly in Hippocratic texts. However, there is perhaps greater 
significance in the Hippocratic author’s word choice. In a text that highlights menstruation 
becoming irregular and eventually ceasing, the author chooses not to place emphasis on this by 
using ta katamēnia. Instead, he draws on the inextricable link between menstruation and 
femaleness to emphasise that, with her menses ended, Phaethousa is losing her femininity. 
Similarly, in the case of Nanno, the author states that the return of her menstruation, described 
with the phrase “τὰ κατὰ φύσιν” (‘ta kata phusin’; the things [that happen] according to 
nature), is the only hope she has of being ‘cured’ by being ‘feminised’ (γυναικωθῆναι; 
gynaikōthēnai). This word derives from the same roots as ta gynaikeia, and as a result, the 
author clearly draws a link between femininity and regular menstruation as ‘natural’ 
collaborators in a healthy female body. Any references to menstruation, therefore, emphasise 
not only that Phaethousa and Nanno are ill, but that they are losing their femininity.  
Alongside her ta gynaikeia, one of the first things Phaethousa loses is her husband. The author 
is distinctly vague, and we are only told that Phaethousa’s husband is “φυγόντος” (fugontos; 
fled, escaped, left, exiled, or been made a fugitive).13 Whether he was exiled, escaping some 
unsavoury or possibly dangerous situation, or even perhaps fleeing Phaethousa herself is not 
clarified, and it is therefore impossible to speculate if his situation had any bearing on her 
subsequent illness. Given that the Hippocratic author does not elaborate and never mentions 
the husband again, it is perhaps not so much the circumstances around his absence, but the 
occurrence itself that is significant. As Ann Ellis Hanson notes, sexual intercourse with the 
husband is a common cure for many women’s diseases in the Hippocratic Corpus, including 
instances where menstruation has ceased.14 Even the ancient Greek language itself suggests the 
perceived importance of a husband. The word ‘γυνή’ (gyne) means both ‘woman’ and ‘wife’; 
                                                          
12 King 2013, 137–138. Jones 1987, 105 identifies the Greek and Latin words for menstruation as ta katamēnia 
(not ta gynaikeia) and menses, which indicate that both cultures expected a regular monthly flow. 
13 Some sixteenth- and seventeenth-century CE commentators argued that her “masculinisation” was triggered by 
a longing for her absent husband. See King 2013, 129–130; King 2016, 98–102. 
14 Hanson 1990, 318–320 See also Jones 1987, 78–79; King 2016, 95.  
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the concept of ‘woman’ is thus inextricably linked to marriage.15 The absence of Phaethousa’s 
husband thus symbolises another important loss of femininity, a fundamental marker of 
Phaethousa’s distinction as a gyne. From the physicians’ perspective, she also loses any chance 
of fully regaining her femininity once again.  
Filling the gap left by these losses in femininity, Phaethousa also gains aspects of ‘masculinity’. 
The Hippocratic author states that Phaethousa’s “τό τε σῶμα ἠνδρώθη” (body was 
masculinised), using ‘ἠνδρώθη’ (ēndrōthē) the conjugated form of the verb ‘ἀνδρόω’ 
(androō). Deriving from ‘ἀνήρ’ (aner) – ‘ἀνδρός’ (andros) in the genitive – the ancient 
Greek word for ‘man’, androō means “to become a man, reach manhood”.16 It is most 
commonly used to describe puberty, the transition from boy to man that results in one acquiring 
physical features traditionally considered masculine: growing a beard and body hair, and voice 
deepening;17 all these things happen to Phaethousa as well, and thus androō would seem to be 
a particularly suitable word. Interestingly, as Helen King notes, the sixteenth-century medical 
humanist Mercurialis examined two other uses of androō in the Hippocratic text On Joints. In 
both instances, the word is used to generally refer to humans who have reached adulthood: 
“οἱ οὖν τοιοῦτοι ὁκόταν ἀνδρωθῶσι” (Such patients, then, when they become adults) and 
“Ὁπόσοισι μὲν οὖν ἂν ἤδη ἠνδρωμένοισι ” (those already adult[s]).18 For Mercurialis, 
these two uses of androō do not reference a gender change, but rather the existence of a matured 
(i.e. post-pubertal) body, and he therefore uses these two examples to deny that Phaethousa and 
Nanno experienced any change in their gender.19 Yet androō’s main use was as a signifier of 
male puberty, and it does not inherently imply that a gender transition occurs, but rather a 
physiological process. What is significant, however, is that in all extant Greek literature prior 
to the turn of the millennium, the word is not used to refer specifically to people assigned 
female at birth, except in the story of Phaethousa and Nanno.20 As a result, the masculinisation 
                                                          
15 See LSJ Online ‘γυνή’. 
16 LSJ Online ‘ἀνδρός’. The first definition of the word given is “change into a man” based on Lyc. 176, who 
uses the word to describe a myth of ants changing into men. 
17 See Chapter 1, 9 and n.16.  
18 Hp. Art. 58, 60. Translation from Withington 1928, 58 = p.341, 60 = p. 343.   
19 King 2016, 116–117. 
20 Apart from Epidemics, only two other uses (out of 56 in total for this period) refer to people assigned female at 
birth: the Hippocratic text (Girls, 1) speaks about married women i.e. women who are “manned up”; and in 
fragment 287, Kratinos (fifth/fourth century BCE comic playwright) refers to a child in the feminine form (ἡ παῖς; 
he pais) who has reached puberty. It is a short fragment and impossible to establish the context.  
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process Phaethousa and Nanno undergo is marked as unusual, demonstrated by the unfamiliar 
application of this word.  
 Even more interesting, the author specifies that it was Phaethousa’s body (σῶμα; sōma) that 
was masculinised. Sōma used directly in conjunction with androō carries significant 
ideological weight because, for an ancient Greek boy experiencing puberty, the change is not 
only physical but also social. With a growing beard comes a higher social standing, the ability 
to participate in government, to fight in wars, and to own property. Phaethousa and Nanno 
experience no such social change. Indeed, as Holmes notes, when traditionally ‘male’ bodily 
features, which are implicitly linked to male social privileges, appear on a person assigned 
female at birth, they become pathological signs.21 Phaethousa’s and Nanno’s transformations 
are thus purely physical, deliberately presented as an unnatural change rendering them diseased 
women, rather than powerful examples of social and physical fluidity. 
Ideally, Phaethousa and Nanno should occupy an intermediate place in society, considered 
neither male nor female, their ambiguity acknowledged. However, the Hippocratic author 
implicitly and explicitly presents a firm and unwavering view of Phaethousa and Nanno as 
incontestably women. This is reinforced by his continued use of feminine word forms to refer 
to them, even after their transformations. He states that Phaethousa “οὐ πουλὺν μετέπειτα 
χρόνον βιώσασα” (did not live much longer), using the participle ‘βιώσασα’ (biōsasa) in 
the feminine form, clearly indicating that Phaethousa is perceived by both the physicians and 
the author himself as a woman even beyond her death.22 Similarly, in the case of Nanno, the 
author recounts the physicians’ failure to ‘feminise’ her, stating that “ἀλλὰ καὶ ταύτῃ οὐκ 
ἠδυνήθη” (in her case too, it was not possible). He uses the demonstrative pronoun in the 
feminine form ‘ταύτῃ’ (tautēi) to refer to Nanno posthumously. It is clear, therefore, that the 
author still considered Phaethousa and Nanno women, despite the physiological changes.  
King develops this concept even further, highlighting the author’s use of the words ‘οἰκουρός’ 
(oikouros) and ‘ἐπίτοκος’ (epitokos). After stringent linguistic analyses, she translates them 
as “a good stay-at-home wife” and a woman who is “always pregnant” and regularly giving 
                                                          
21 Holmes 2012, 15. 
22 See also Holmes 2012, 15. 
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birth.23 King argues that the author’s word choice thus emphasises Phaethousa’s extremely 
feminine behaviour; she is devoted to her female duties in the household (oikouros), and is 
considerably fertile with a highly-functioning womb (epitokos).24 King thus concludes that, in 
an ancient Greek world theorised by scholars like Thomas Laqueur to be full of gender fluidity, 
Phaethousa “stands out as an example of the way in which [Hippocratic writers] instead mix 
biology and culture, and regard [gender] difference, rather than fluidity, as key.”25 However, 
although King does not state it, the author’s focus on femininity allows him to strongly 
establish what he confirms throughout: their ta gynaikeia might be gone and their bodies 
masculinised, but they could never actually be anything other than women. And this answers 
the question I posed at the beginning of this section: why does the author not use any of the 
existing ancient Greek words that describe physical ambiguity? The answer lies not only in the 
fact that these were terms reserved for people assigned male at birth, but also in the fact that, 
in his eyes, Phaethousa and Nanno were never ambiguous; they were diseased women suffering 
an unnatural illness. Their ambiguous bodies cannot be returned to a state of perceived stability 
again, and as a result, they die. 
 
2.2. SUBMISSION AND CONTROL 
Everything in the author’s description of Phaethousa and Nanno – their implicit unnaturalness, 
their loss of femininity and gain of masculinity, their retained distinction as women – displays 
his profound discomfort with physical ambiguity, which is further echoed by the actions of the 
physicians. When Phaethousa’s and Nanno’s bodies change, the physicians attempt to re-
establish clarity, because in their eyes, the bodies of the two have moved out of a culturally-
constructed notion of what is acceptably ‘female’. For the physicians, this is a frightening and 
unexpected reality; they respond by attempting to regain mastery and control over the unruly 
bodies. Operating within culturally-normative ideas of what a man or woman must be, they are 
at liberty to make subjective decisions on a patient’s gender, thus dictating and reinforcing the 
boundaries of ‘male’ and ‘female’. For instance, Diodorus Siculus describes the story of Kallon 
(discussed at length in Chapter 3), who experiences similar changes to Phaethousa and Nanno. 
Kallon is assigned female at birth, but later develops a painful tumour around his genitals 
                                                          
23 King 2013, 137, 139. 
24 King 2013, 137–140; King 2016, 107–111. 
25 King 2013, 140. 
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that, when bisected, reveals testes and an imperforate penis (one in which the urethra does not 
run through). He then undergoes extensive surgery to bring his genitals in line with cultural 
perceptions of ‘correctness’. In contrast to Kallon – whose ‘masculinisation’ was accepted – 
the physicians conclude that Phaethousa and Nanno are still women, albeit suffering a 
mysterious illness, and therefore any treatment must return them to a female state. Thus, they 
are forced to submit to ‘feminising’ treatment (which is never fully outlined), their bodies 
dominated by cultural norms and medical authorities. Even the fact that they die illustrates that 
not only is ambiguity seen as an ‘illness’, but also as a transient, rather than final, state. For 
these authors, ambiguity must be resolved, and if a body cannot be forced to conform to a 
particular gender, it cannot (or should not) survive. In each case, the power rests with the 
physician in question to remove ambiguity, either surgically in Kallon’s case, or in failed 
attempts at healing in Phaethousa’s and Nanno’s. 
Not only are cultural norms directly imposed on the bodies of Phaethousa and Nanno, there is 
also no indication that their opinion is considered or that they have any input in the doctor’s 
processes. Ann Ellis Hanson and Lesley Dean-Jones both note that, in classical Greece, women 
were far more likely to seek medical assistance from local wise-women and midwives, and 
doctors were only brought in to examine and treat female patients in dire situations.26 Indeed, 
the presence of the physicians in the story is perhaps useful shorthand, emphasising the author’s 
serious concern surrounding these changes into physical ambiguity. Moreover, Holmes notes 
that a physician in the classical period carried considerable authority because, through his 
training, he can claim to understand body processes. She states that: 
These processes are imagined to be internal to the nature of the sōma; [medical 
skill] enables the physician to manipulate them intentionally. The key term here 
is ‘intentionally,’ which signals the presence of an agent whose intelligence is 
in some sense discontinuous with both the sōma’s vital forces and the death 
drive of the disease. […] In fact, in the classical period, the physician seems to 
represent a kind of idealized intelligent agency.27 
As she points out, agency – specifically control over treatment, diagnosis, healing, and even 
death – lies with the physician rather than with the patient. As a result, Phaethousa and Nanno 
lose autonomy over their own bodies once the physician is called in, their voices subsumed by 
                                                          
26 Dean-Jones 1994, 31–36; Hanson 1990, 309. 
27 Holmes 2010, 25. 
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the authority claimed by their doctors. We cannot know what Phaethousa and Nanno thought, 
how they felt, their sufferings, or their opinions, and they thus become silent, passive victims 
to the violence of cultural gender normativity. 
This is perhaps unsurprising. Epidemics, like the majority of works in this period, was written 
with the authoritative tone of an upper-class male physician, producing a text for other medical 
practitioners. It was important to report the case, not the patient’s opinion or experience. 
Interestingly, King speculates that the story of Phaethousa and Nanno was unlikely to have 
been a first-hand account. Comparing other case studies in Epidemics, she highlights the 
author’s lack of singular first person wording (the author only uses first person plurals, stating 
‘we did’ rather than ‘I did’), the lack of verbs suggesting direct contact with the patient, and 
the absence of any direct reporting of the patient’s own words. King thus concludes that the 
account was merely an anecdote reported to the author, which he decided to include to warn 
his readers of an extremely rare illness that could potentially occur again.28 This is highly 
significant. Phaethousa’s and Nanno’s voices become even more doctored and distilled by an 
author without first-hand experience of their cases. He is able to dictate what is or is not 
significant enough to be included in the text, and thus he controls how Phaethousa and Nanno, 
and their genders, are perceived throughout. His use of language designates them as diseased 
women, and divests them of agency over their own tale, not only removing their power to 
comment on their own treatments, but also denying them a voice in preserving their story for 
the future. 
 
2.3. REGAINING AGENCY: READING BETWEEN THE LINES 
The physicians and the author make desperate attempts to regain control over Phaethousa and 
Nanno by stripping them of agency and claiming superior authority. As Holmes notes, 
physicians built their skill on the assumption that the body was something that could be 
understood and mastered. However, they also acknowledged that “physical bodies are spaces 
of multiple possibilities that exceed what medicine can map. The sōma is, then, not simply an 
object of rational control but also something that evades control.”29 Phaethousa’s and Nanno’s 
bodies do just that. They are depicted as beyond human help, and with their deaths, the author 
                                                          
28 King 2013, 128; King 2016, 93.  
29 Holmes 2010, 26. 
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is able to reinforce a physician’s cultural authority over matters of the body. If the physicians 
are unable to remove gender ambiguity, nature itself steps in and re-affirms their initial 
diagnosis: unruly bodies do not survive and gender ambiguity is a transient, not a final, state. 
However, Phaethousa’s and Nanno’s ambiguous bodies are not in a transient state. They 
experience the initial change without any input from physicians; their menses simply stop, their 
bodies pushed into ambiguity by some unnamed, natural force, and they resist any attempts at 
human intervention.  
John Winkler states that when we read between the lines of ancient Greek texts written by and 
for elite men, we can find “hesitations, refusals to speak, backtracking”, and consequently 
discover a plurality of practices, norms, and meanings.30 Reading between the lines of this text, 
we find it is not Phaethousa and Nanno who lose agency, but the physicians themselves. 
Phaethousa’s and Nanno’s bodies defy any further changes – all their changes are naturally, 
rather than humanly, imposed – and their bodies utterly confound the physicians. Their 
reactions are telling of their frustrations: “πάντα πραγματευσαμένων” (we tried 
everything); “μία ἐλπὶς εἶναι” (there was [only] one hope); “πάντα ποιούντων” (having 
tried everything). Likely these words do illustrate the frustration and legitimate desperation of 
physicians who are attempting to help a patient; however, they also suggest their frustration at 
their lack of power and inability to control the ‘unruly bodies’. They are unable to be altered 
by any human means, and even after their deaths, their bodies continue to interest and confound 
scholars, providing no answers and allowing only speculation on their circumstances. 
Phaethousa’s and Nanno’s eternally ambiguous bodies thus turn the tables, taking power and 
agency away from the physicians who would seek to control them. They may be Hippocrates’ 
‘women’, but simultaneously they complicate this simplistic classification. 
 
3. QUEERING EPIDEMICS 
3.1. LANGUAGE AND TIME: ANCIENT AND MODERN 
Phaethousa and Nanno regularly reappear in history to both support and challenge ideas about 
‘unnatural’ gender ambiguity, bridging ancient and modern worlds. However, the Hippocratic 
author’s simplistic classification of them as diseased women has persisted. For example, the 
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sixteenth-century medical humanist Mercuralis not only emphatically retained the Hippocratic 
author’s view of Phaethousa and Nanno as diseased women, but also consistently denied that 
they could ever ‘become’ men, thus refusing to acknowledge any ambiguity in their genders.31 
Moreover, the Hippocratic author’s choice to avoid established words that describe gender 
ambiguity, such as hermaphroditos or androgynos, continued in later commentaries. King 
notes that several sixteenth- and seventeenth-century commentators and medical historians 
including Luis Mercardo, Jacques Farrand, and Jacques Guillemeau argued that Phaethousa 
was merely a woman suffering from a prolapsed womb and in no way was a ‘true 
hermaphrodite’.32 Unlike a ‘male hermaphrodite’ or a ‘female hermaphrodite’ (who were both 
usually fertile, but had non-normalised genitalia), a ‘true hermaphrodite’ had both ‘male’ and 
‘female’ genitals at the same time. 33 They would thus resemble the ancient intersex deity 
Hermaphroditos, who was born with a combination of traditionally ‘male’ and ‘female’ 
genitalia, and was regularly depicted in art as a figure with breasts, a penis, and testes.34 The 
sixteenth- and seventeenth-century concept of a ‘true hermaphrodite’ was thus borrowed 
directly from the ancient world, and various commentators used an ancient example of physical 
gender ambiguity, Phaethousa and Nanno, to reinforce their own contemporary theories on 
‘true hermaphroditism’. Like the Hippocratic author, these commentators preferred to think of 
Phaethousa and Nanno as diseased women, and just like their ancient counterpart, they avoided 
the use of established terms for physical ambiguity. Moreover, by alluding back to ancient 
precedents, these commentators thus brought Phaethousa and Nanno into their contemporary 
world by ‘re-diagnosing’ them. 
James Young Simpson took this position even further in 1839; not only does he bridge ancient 
and modern worlds, but he also ventures into the realms of anachronism. For him, Phaethousa 
did not ‘become’ a man, and was not a ‘true hermaphrodite’, but also did not remain a ‘normal’ 
woman. Instead, she became a virago, a type of ancient Roman woman who exhibited a more 
‘masculine’ character; however, Simpson expands on this, defining a virago as a woman who 
was past child-bearing age, whose ovaries no longer functioned, and whose body therefore 
became more masculine – something that was often accompanied with a more masculine 
                                                          
31 King 2013, 132; King 2016, 117–119. A few commentators believed Phaethousa experienced a full gender 
transition. See Holmes 2012, 196; King 2016, 83–84, 117–119. 
32 King 2013, 128–130. ‘Hermaphrodite’ is a now-outdated term for an intersex person. See Chapter 1, 18. 
33 King 2013, 129; King 2016, 82–83. 
34 See Diod. Sic. 4.6.5; Delcourt 1961, 43–66; Holmes 2012, 76–79; LIMC ‘Hermaphroditos’. In Ovid (Met. 4. 
274–388), Hermaphroditos was an adolescent boy whose body was merged with the nymph Salmacis. 
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temperament.35 Like other commentators before him, Simpson’s analysis combines ancient and 
modern elements; for instance, ovaries were unknown in Hippocrates’ time, but Simpson 
utilised modern ideas about them in his analysis. Although dismissing ‘true hermaphroditism’, 
a concept with roots in both antiquity and later periods, he nevertheless identified the ancient 
Greek Phaethousa and Nanno with an ancient Roman concept. The virago would have been 
unfamiliar to Hippocratic writers, and Simpson’s analysis becomes thus anachronistic. He 
overlooks traditional historicist modes of inquiry, which are based on a system of periodisation 
and alterity; the past is different to the present and needs to be bound to its specific temporal 
and historical context.36 Even though Simpson was writing a medical text – thus not necessarily 
required to observe the traditional historicism that frowns upon anachronism – his disregard 
for historical periodisation is nevertheless fascinating because his analysis pushes Phaethousa 
and Nanno outside linear time into an almost timeless word.  
Conversely, King relies on historicist analysis to inform her reading of the text. In her linguistic 
exploration of the words oikouros and epitokos, she concludes that Phaethousa is presented as 
highly feminine and particularly womanly, drawing upon textual evidence from other 
Hippocratic authors, and the second-century CE medical writer Galen. She also examines 
translations of the text in English and French, thus bridging not only various time periods, but 
also several language barriers in her analysis.37 Yet elsewhere she shies away from ‘textbook’ 
anachronism, when she briefly discusses Phaethousa and Nanno in the context of nineteenth-
century ‘freak shows’ that often exhibited ‘bearded ladies’.38 Increasing unease about the rise 
in women’s rights movements of the nineteenth century occurred alongside an increasing 
fascination with bearded ladies; for King, calling Phaethousa and Nanno bearded ladies lays 
inappropriate emphasis on them as “some physically repulsive proto-feminist[s]” rather than 
the author’s original portrayal of them as paragons of feminine virtue.39 She feels that 
examining Phaethousa and Nanno in the context of nineteenth-century bearded ladies would 
bring in an unhelpful “set of assumptions that had no place in ancient Greece.”40 However, 
King dismisses this “set of assumptions” based purely on the argument of faithfulness to 
                                                          
35 King 2013, 134–135. Virago had positive connotations, and could be used to refer to a woman (including a 
goddess) who was physically strong, or even warlike or heroic. See OLD ‘virago’. 
36 See Chapter 1, 15–16; Bevir 2011, 24; Jardine 2000, 251. 
37 King 2013, 137–139. 
38 By textbook anachronism, I mean using terms or concepts that are perceived by traditional history to be 
completely alien to the period in question. See Jardine 2000, 252–253. King also briefly compares ancient Roman 
‘monster markets’ with nineteenth century ‘freak shows’. See King 2016, 81 
39 King 2013, 135–137. 
40 King 2013, 136. 
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historical periodisation (“they had no place in ancient Greece”), abandoning this form of 
anachronistic disloyalty to linear history in favour of another. Modern translations of 
Epidemics, as well as Galen’s texts and commentaries are chronologically and culturally distant 
from Hippocrates’ time – consider the fact that Galen knew about ovaries but Hippocratic 
physicians did not – and these works would also bring with them an anachronistic set of 
assumptions. Neither is inherently more helpful or less anachronistic than the other simply 
because traditional history would view, for instance, a nineteenth-century translation of 
Epidemics as more-or-less belonging to Hippocrates’ world, whereas nineteenth-century 
bearded ladies would be seen as completely unrelated entities. 
Moreover, rejecting the anachronistic concept of bearded ladies as ‘unhelpful’ also dismisses 
the helpful assumptions and comparisons this could bring. Bearded ladies were exhibited as 
cultural curiosities. They were caught in-between two polar opposites (male and female), 
denied conventional femininity because of their beard, but simultaneously denied the chance 
to occupy the male world. Phaethousa and Nanno are also caught in the middle, removed from 
masculinity because the author goes to great lengths to over-emphasise their femininity. 
Phaethousa and Nanno thus become medical curiosities, arousing a similar wonder and fear 
that attendees of nineteenth-century shows experienced. Indeed, they are constantly treated as 
medical oddities that need explaining, scattered across various scientific texts throughout 
history. Phaethousa and Nanno thus became exhibits much like the bearded ladies themselves, 
their ambiguous bodies pulled out for display in text after text.  
These various receptions of Phaethousa and Nanno thus blur historical distinctions, filled with 
a varied mixture of features belonging to different time periods, and a vagueness that suits their 
equally vague story. They become less anachronistic, but rather achronistic, existing in the 
‘grey area’, the gaps that exist between distinct binary genders and linearly-defined time 
periods. It is by probing these gaps and thinking unhistorically that they seem to come to life; 
the short and concise text becomes vibrant and lively. They begin to break down barriers 
between previously stable cultural constructs like time and gender. Queer Unhistoricism turns 
the ‘rules’ of history on their head by encouraging the use of anachronism, yet by doing so it 
also allows us to question whether history has ever truly been devoid of it. Calling Phaethousa 
and Nanno both ‘women’ was necessitated by the limitations of English (and Greek); however, 
their transformations thoroughly complicate the idea of a gender binary split into male and 
female. Importantly, words like ‘male’, ‘female’, ‘man’, ‘woman’, ‘masculine’, and ‘feminine’ 
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are all taken for granted, practically considered ahistorical concepts. However, they are in fact 
culturally-locked, with vastly different meanings in different time periods. What do these terms 
refer to today? A person’s gender identity? Their gender assigned at birth? The physical make-
up of their bodies? Their gender expression? An ancient Greek person would not necessarily 
be asking exactly the same questions, and they certainly would not get the same answers. Yet 
we nevertheless apply these terms, which can have such varied meanings to us compared to the 
ancient Greeks, to the ancient world without question.  
This is the same issue that many queer historians have encountered when attempting to refute 
the ‘straight until proven otherwise’ view of history – the traditional presumption that all great 
figures in the past only practiced opposite-gender attraction and love. Arising out of historicist 
and altericist thinking, this view denies the existence of historical same-gender attraction 
because words like ‘homosexual’ or ‘same-gender love’ and their associated concepts would 
have had different meanings (or be completely anachronistic) in historical periods.41 Yet, 
despite any evidence to the contrary, traditional history will always assume that people in the 
past practiced opposite-gender love, without acknowledging that ‘opposite-gender’ would also 
have been viewed differently in the past.42 Thus with both sexuality and gender, scholars 
predominantly assume that historical societies conform to modern norms, and that these norms 
are transhistorical. Why can we not flip this script? In particular, if we can apply words like 
‘woman/man’, ‘male/female’, and ‘masculine/feminine’ practically without question to the 
ancient world, why not ‘intersex’, ‘transgender’, or ‘non-binary’?43 Both groups of words 
would be anachronistic and so to argue ‘woman’ is acceptable, but ‘intersex’ is not on the basis 
of historical (and historicist) context, only serves to further support an agenda that denies the 
historical existence of queer people, simply because they are seen as some kind of ‘new’ 
concept. Moreover, by flipping this script, we can challenge persistent notions that history 
presents some kind of stable, factual ‘truth’ about the world.  
                                                          
41 See Dinshaw et al. 2007, 185–186; Goldberg and Menon 2005, 1611–1612; Halperin 1990, 24–36; Matzner 
2016, 191. 
42 For example, the Renaissance artist Michelangelo wrote explicitly homoerotic poetry (that was even altered by 
his grand-nephew). However, his sexuality is often a topic for debate, with commentators preferring to label him 
a chaste, non-sexual person, rather than bring his same-gender desire into the equation. See Norton 1997, 143; 
Saslow 1988, 77. 
43 Interestingly, these words retain a connection to the ancient world: ‘intersex’ combines the Latin words ‘inter’ 
and ‘sexus’ (‘between sexes’); ‘transgender’ is formed from Latin ‘trans’ (across), and ‘gender’, itself derived 
from ancient Greek ‘γένος’ (genos; type, kind, group, kin) and Latinised by the Romans as ‘genus’; non-binary 
comes from the Latin ‘bis’ (double, two). 
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3.4. QUEER TIME IN EPIDEMICS  
Phaethousa and Nanno begin to break down barriers between previously stable cultural 
constructs such as time and gender, and instead move on to fully inhabit the ‘grey area’. They 
thus live in Queer Time, in a non-linear, fluid, and multidimensional space that allows us to 
examine their story as a timeless tale that constantly probes the grey area of gender. We can 
also evaluate their experiences outside of their historical context.44 By suspending 
chronological difference – as queer unhistoricists such as Jonathan Goldberg and Madhavi 
Menon advocate – between the ancient and modern world and detaching them from linear time, 
inherent similarities to the modern trans or intersex experience are thrown into sharp relief. Just 
like their modern queer counterparts, Phaethousa and Nanno do not experience time in 
normalised, linear ways.  
For instance, the physiological changes Phaethousa and Nanno experience – cessation of their 
menstruation, their body hair and beard growth, and deepening voices – resonate with those of 
a modern trans man or transmasculine individual undertaking hormone replacement therapy. 
Trans people often refer to this period of time as their ‘second’ or ‘correct’ puberty, because it 
is a series of processes that enables their physical expression to match more closely their 
internal sense of gender. In this context, the term androō, which initially was particularly 
conspicuous, becomes remarkably appropriate: Phaethousa and Nanno are literally undergoing 
a puberty process. Applying ‘trans’ gives a whole new meaning to the author’s word choice 
and, instead of marking out Phaethousa’s and Nanno’s transformations as something 
immediately unfamiliar and unnatural, in fact repositions our thinking, allowing us to fully 
appreciate the chronological implications of the term. In this context, androō does not signify 
an unnatural change, but rather the repetition of a natural one. For Phaethousa and Nanno, time 
jumps back (a second puberty), but also progresses forwards (a pre-pubescent body developing 
into an adolescent one) at the same time. Furthermore, the author never specifies how old 
Phaethousa and Nanno are, and King argues that there is no evidence to suggest they are post-
menopausal.45 Thus, they die outside normative expectations of a person’s age at death, and 
perhaps too soon given the sudden nature of their deaths. Moreover, the author states that 
Phaethousa “ἐπίτοκος ἐοῦσα τοῦ ἔμπροσθεν χρόνου” (had already borne her children) 
before her death. Marriage and producing children were among the most important 
                                                          
44 See Chapter 1, 17. 
45 King 2013, 134–135; King 2016, 78–80. 
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achievements in the life of an ancient Greek woman.46 Because the author presents them as 
women without question, it is fascinating that they die after they had already given birth; 
Phaethousa and Nanno may have thus died too soon, but they nevertheless did not die with the 
social obligations associated with their assigned gender unfulfilled. However, their deaths also 
take place after their second puberties, and as a result, Phaethousa and Nanno die at 
simultaneously the right time (after a fulfilled life) and the wrong time (too soon, and as new 
adolescents after their second puberty). Their life experiences are thus ones of 
transtemporality, jumping across blocks of normative time – again the word ‘trans’ plays a 
significant role in depicting their experience of time as thoroughly queer and non-linear.  
However, the term ‘trans’ also carries with it the idea of agency. Compared to Phaethousa and 
Nanno, who spontaneously experience their second puberty and have no control over the 
physicians’ treatments, trans people in the modern world are thought have far more control 
over their transitions. This is true to a certain extent. The choice to go on hormones, undertake 
surgery, update legal documents, and socially transition is, in theory, up to the person in 
question. However, in many ways trans people are just as limited in their agency as Phaethousa 
and Nanno. In Epidemics 6, dominant authorities (the physicians and the author) are the ones 
who set and dictate the boundaries of ‘male’ and ‘female’, and who control treatment. This is 
just as true today. Governments and medical institutions have the power to dictate how and 
when a person can transition. Usually referred to as ‘gate-keeping’, legal authorities can set 
certain parameters for trans people to meet before they can update documents such as birth 
certificates, passports, and driver’s licenses. These can include legal name changes, and proof 
that they have lived openly in their correct gender for a certain period of time; moreover, legal 
transition is often also subject to certain medical criteria, including proof of psychological 
treatment, hormone therapy, surgery, and even sterilisation.47 Thus, even when they wish to 
(and are able to) pursue transition, their power to do so is directly policed by legal, medical, 
and social authorities that dictate how their bodies should look and behave. If they do not 
conform to all aspects of ‘what makes a man’ or ‘what makes a woman’, they can be demonised 
and considered ‘ill’.  
                                                          
46 Cf. Helen in the Odyssey, who is no longer able to have children, her punishment after her return from Troy 
(4.11–14); Aristotle draws a strong connection between femininity and fecundity (GA 746b21–747a4).  See also 
Arist. Pol. 335a–b; Pl. Laws. 772d–773e; X. Oec. 7.12–30; Brulé 2003, 64, 139, 157–161; Dover 1974, 95–99; 
Hanson 1990, 318–320; Henderson 1988, 1252–1253; Kent 2006, 87. 
47 See also Chapter 3, 56–57.  
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Phaethousa and Nanno thus lack control over their physical changes, and are also perceived as 
‘unnatural’ by the dominant social norms of their time. As well as those of trans individuals, 
Phaethousa and Nanno also closely reflect the experiences of intersex people, particularly those 
who are (most commonly) assigned female at birth, but experience physical changes (often at 
puberty) due to their own naturally high production of testosterone. Often called ‘virilisation’ 
by medical practitioners today, people with these types of intersex variations are regularly 
subjected to medical treatments and surgeries to bring their bodies in line with cultural 
perceptions of ‘correctness’. Phaethousa and Nanno suffer similarly, with the physicians 
desperately trying to regain control of their bodies by reinstating their perception of what is 
‘normal’ and subjecting them to ‘feminising’ treatments.48 Silenced by the power and authority 
of the physicians, Phaethousa and Nanno have no autonomy over their own bodies.  
Moreover, normative conceptions of time would dictate that gender assignment happens at 
birth, and does not need to be altered or medically maintained later in life. In this standardised, 
linear timeline, people are born, assigned a gender, and experience a puberty that follows that 
initial gender assignment; they do not need to have a puberty medically induced that will ensure 
their bodies conform to social norms of ‘correct’, binary gendered bodies. Thus, normalised 
ideas about gender and the body are linked to normative conceptions of linear time. But for 
intersex people, gender assignment can happen much later in life, or can exist in a state of 
limbo for many years, while they are subjected to intensive and invasive medical treatment to 
‘correct’ their bodies. Intersex people thus challenge the idea that the link between linear time 
and binary gender must be ‘normal’. After all, Phaethousa and Nanno experience a natural and 
spontaneous change in adulthood that challenges the stability of gender. Their example thus 
clearly demonstrates how deeply ingrained ideas about binary gender are in both ancient and 
modern societies. We are constantly limited and controlled by the strictures of gender dualism, 
which erases the existence (quite literally in the case of Phaethousa and Nanno) of the non-
standard individual.  
Phaethousa and Nanno also defy these norms. Their bodies resist any attempts to reverse the 
changes, and the efforts of the physicians to restore a sense of perceived stability end in failure. 
Gender is often considered a construct that human ability can control and, therefore, dominant 
authorities in the ancient and the modern worlds create medical and legal processes to deal with 
non-normalised bodies and genders. Ambiguity, conversely, is thought of as an unstable and 
                                                          
48 See also Chapter 3, 41–52. 
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precarious state, artfully illustrated by several factors including: the physicians’ desperate 
attempts to reverse Phaethousa’s and Nanno’s changes, the author’s insistence on emphasising 
their femininity, and the various receptions of their story that firmly maintain a view of their 
ambiguity as merely an unnatural disease. However, in the story of Phaethousa and Nanno, 
ambiguity – this state that is perceived to be unstable and precarious – in fact becomes a stable 
state. The ambiguity of Phaethousa’s and Nanno’s bodies is unchanging, thus transcending 
cultural norms and leaving the gender binary destroyed in its wake.  
In addition, ambiguity becomes a force more powerful than these culturally-enforced binary 
norms, clearly indicating the arbitrary nature of gender. Phaethousa’s and Nanno’s experience 
of gender is thus non-binary. They constantly exist in state that flows between ‘man’ or 
‘woman’, impossible to fully define as one or the other. In Chapter 1, I mentioned how words 
like ‘trans’, ‘intersex’, and ‘non-binary’ in their very definitions, rely on the gender binary to 
be explained. However, a word such as ‘non-binary’ can also clearly demonstrate the incredible 
power of ambiguity. Non-binary is something defined by what it is not, defined by its non-
conformity to conformity. It therefore perfectly illustrates the complex situation Phaethousa 
and Nanno continually exist in, and allows their bodies to not only maintain their incredible 
boundary-breaking power, but also speak for themselves as entities that are constantly liberated 
from and limited by the gender binary. I could therefore refer to them individually with the 
singular gender-neutral pronoun ‘they’. Doing so, alongside calling them non-binary, allows 
Phaethousa and Nanno to exist in a stable state in which their ambiguity is constantly 
challenging the artificiality of cultural norms. They are able to exist inside and outside culture, 
inside and outside gender, inside and outside time.  
 
4. CONCLUSION: THE GREY AREA SPEAKS UP 
I started this chapter by discussing Robin Goodman from Ali Smith’s novel, the character who, 
like Phaethousa and Nanno, simultaneously defies gender norms and is forced to fit into them. 
For Smith, Robin lives inside a ‘grey area’, a powerful space of gender exploration. It is an 
incredibly vague term, matching the similarly vague story of Phaethousa and Nanno; indeed, 
the account of their transformations is intended as a quick examination of a strange natural shift 
into ambiguity that renders two people, consistently perceived to be female, as diseased 
women. Phaethousa and Nanno, on the surface, seem disempowered, but upon closer 
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examination we see that their bodies regain agency and power from those who would seek to 
control them. They remain eternally confusing to generations of commentators, refusing to be 
neatly categorised. The story of Phaethousa and Nanno also explores the power of language, 
both as a method of control (they are constantly called ‘women’) and as a method of resistance 
(this classification as ‘women’ is suspect). The grey area speaks up, taking back control from 
those who would seek to control and simplify it. 
Through unhistoricist analysis and the use of anachronistic terms, the grey area can begin to be 
expanded, filled up with powerful new language; words like ‘trans’, ‘intersex’, and ‘non-
binary’ are able to perfectly illustrate the complexities of Phaethousa’s and Nanno’s genders. 
They truly encompass the ambiguity of a grey area that is limited by and liberated from the 
gender binary, a grey area simultaneously reliant on and in defiance of cultural norms. 
Moreover, the use of the modern terms not only serves as a useful way of articulating complex 
ideas, but also highlights the non-linearity of Phaethousa’s and Nanno’s story, and thus 
emphasises the symbiotic relationship between gender and time. To exist in a grey area of 
gender, is to exist in a grey space of time; each informs the other. Language therefore has the 
power to highlight, reinforce, and challenge the binary, linear, constructed, and arbitrary nature 
of both time and gender. In the story of Phaethousa and Nanno, the ambiguity of their gender, 
the timelessness of their story, and the power of language to reclaim their agency all highlight 
how powerful and pervasive the grey area is. It is everywhere, naturally-occurring and limited 
only by our arbitrary cultural norms that dictate what ‘normality’ must be.
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CHAPTER 3  
DIODORUS: CHAOS AND ORDER  
Normality wasn’t normal. It couldn’t be. If normality were normal, everybody 
could leave it alone. They could sit back and let normality manifest itself. But 
people – especially doctors – had doubts about normality. They weren’t sure 
normality was up to the job. And so they felt inclined to give it a boost.1 
Cal, the main character of Jeffrey Eugenides’ highly-acclaimed novel Middlesex (2002) makes 
an important observation on social norms: they are thoroughly constructed. People – especially 
those with an authoritative voice – feel inclined to dictate and uphold arbitrary norms about 
how everyone should look and act, in order to “give [normality] a boost”. Cal has a complex 
relationship with the idea of normality. He was assigned female at birth, but in his mid-teens 
he discovered he had 5-alpha reductase deficiency, an intersex trait that affects the hormonal 
synthesis of androgens. His doctors wanted to surgically alter his genitals so that they fit 
socially-normative conceptions of ‘female’ genitalia. However, it is at this point in his life that 
he realises he does not identify as a woman. He refuses any surgeries and goes on to socially 
transition to male, but this is not merely a simple shift from femininity to masculinity. Cal 
“never felt out of place being a girl [but still doesn’t] feel entirely at home among men.”2 Social 
normativity thus continues to govern him, and he can never quite fit into clearly defined cultural 
limits of ‘normal’.  
Similarly to Cal, Diophantos and Kallon in Diodorus Siculus’ Bibliotheca Historica are also 
intersex; scholars have even demonstrated that they likely also had 5-alpha reductase 
deficiency.3 They are assigned female at birth, but find their bodies spontaneously change later 
in life, with penises and testes rapidly revealed. Diodorus uses their tale to argue that gender 
ambiguity is simply a transient state, and that maleness and femaleness are entirely separate. 
Unlike Phaethousa and Nanno, liminal beings who defy simple categorisation and are firmly 
non-binary, Eugenides’ Cal, and Diodorus’ Diophantos and Kallon, are the opposite. Although 
all three experience subsequent ambiguity in their social and/or physical gender, they 
nevertheless are controlled by cultural norms that force them to conform to an ‘intelligible’ 
binary gender. Where Phaethousa and Nanno represent the stability of ambiguity – something 
                                                          
1 Eugenides 2002, 446. 
2 Eugenides 2002, 479. 
3 See below, 46–47.  
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thought to be completely unstable – the stories of Diophantos and Kallon appear in stark 
contrast, seemingly tales of control, order, and the removal of ambiguity.  
 
1. DIOPHANTOS AND KALLON 
1.1. DIODORUS SICULUS’ BIBLIOTHECA HISTORICA 
Bibliotheca Historica was written from approximately 60–30 BCE by Diodorus Siculus, a 
Hellenistic Greek historian based in Sicily. Intended to be a universal history of the ancient 
Mediterranean, spanning from its mythological beginnings to Julius Caesar’s first consulship 
in 59 BCE, only the first five books and Books 11–20 of the original 40 survive in full (although 
various fragments also survive).  The story of Diophantos and Kallon in Book 32, for instance, 
is preserved in the works of Photius, the ninth-century CE Byzantine Patriarch of 
Constantinople.4 Diodorus has long been considered a copyist, only valuable for preserving the 
now extinct voices of various philosophical and historical authors of the period. However, 
Kenneth Sacks disputes this, stating that Diodorus’ originality lies in his purpose: to impress 
upon his readers the notion that history can be a useful and beneficial learning tool.5  
Diodorus even clearly states that he included the cases of Diophantos (32.10) and Kallon 
(32.11), alongside other examples of ambiguous beings (32.12), “οὐ ψυχαγωγίας ἀλλ᾿ 
ὠφελείας ἕνεκα τῶν ἀναγινωσκόντων” (not for entertainment, but for the benefit of our 
readers; 32.12.1).6 He tells these stories to dispel the superstitious fears that often lead to 
vigilante and state-sanctioned violence against people with ambiguous bodies, violence that 
Diodorus considers misplaced because these people “ὁμοίας κεκοινωνηκότα φύσεως” 
(share a common nature with us; 32.12.2). Diodorus is adamant that ‘male’ and ‘female’ are 
entirely separate categories, and therefore ambiguity is simply an illness, an ‘error of nature’ 
concealing a person’s ‘true’ gender and creating a ‘false’ impression to mystify humanity.7 As 
Rebecca Langlands states, for Diodorus any change in gender “is paradigmatic of the kind of 
                                                          
4 Photius, Bib. 377–379 B; see also Walton 1957, vii–x; Goukowsky 2012, xlii–xliii. 
5 Sacks 1990, 23–33; Sacks 1994, 213–218; see also Armeni et al. 2014, 579–580. Diodorus was “not concerned 
with improving the general's strategic skills and the politician's powers of diplomacy. Rather, the historian 
encourages the noble deeds of all peoples through the emphasis on civic virtue”. Sacks 1990, 25. 
6 Greek text from Walton 1957. Unless otherwise indicated, all translations are my own. 
7 For Aristotle, one of the two binary genders must always predominate in a body, and any indication of ambiguity 
is merely a disguise and is contrary to nature. See Arist. GA 772b26–773a24. 
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puzzle that the natural universe can pose for the imperfectly understanding mortal”.8 He 
therefore aims to educate his readers that violence against beings with non-normalised bodies 
is misplaced because gender ambiguity cannot exist at all; there can be nothing to fear if, as he 
argues, ambiguous bodies are merely caught in a transitory state between gender and are able 
to be remedied by medical skill. 
 
1.2. DIOPHANTOS AND KALLON 
The accounts of Diophantos and Kallon take place in the mid-second century BCE, 
approximately thirty years apart. Diophantos was assigned female at birth, initially named 
Heraïs, and was married to a man called Samiades. While his husband was abroad on a long 
journey, Diophantos fell ill, with an inflamed tumour arising around his abdomen causing 
severe swelling and fevers. The physicians tried to reduce the tumour, but a week later it burst 
open and revealed a penis and testes. Only Diophantos’ mother and maidservants witnessed 
this event, tending to him as best they could and hiding the secret. When Diophantos recovered, 
he continued to wear female clothing, and resumed his wifely duties around the household. The 
family members and servants who knew the secret assumed that Diophantos was a 
“ἑρμαφρόδιτον” (‘hermaphrodite’; 32.10.4), and had previously engaged in same-gender 
sexual practices with his husband, which was in Diodorus’ view “τῆς κατὰ φύσιν 
ἐπιπλοκῆς” (sexual intercourse [that is] contrary to nature; 32.10.4).  
Eventually, Samiades returned and demanded his wife see him, but Diophantos refused out of 
shame and fear. When he insisted, Diophantos’ father also denied the request, too ashamed to 
offer a reason. Angered, Samiades took the family to court to debate whether a father or a 
husband had more ownership over a woman’s body. When the jury decided in favour of the 
husband, Diophantos removed his clothing, revealing to the court his “τὸ τῆς φύσεως ἄρρεν” 
(masculine nature; 32.10.6), and loudly protesting the court’s ruling that would see “συνοικεῖν 
ἀνδρὶ τὸν ἄνδρα” (a man living in wedlock with another man; 32.10.6–7). After this public 
declaration of his gender, Diophantos began wearing male clothing, and was examined by 
physicians. They concluded that his penis and testes had been concealed in an egg-like sac 
within his body, leading to the growth of a tumour and its eventual rupture. They also saw fit 
                                                          
8 Langlands 2002, 92. 
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to make several incisions around his genitals in order to make them “εὔκοσμον” (well-
ordered/in good order; 32.10.8). It was only after this surgery that Diophantos changed his 
name (from Heraïs to Diophantos) and began to live openly as male, enrolling in the cavalry 
and pursuing a life of military glory. 
Following the story of Diophantos, Diodorus gives an account of Kallon, who was assigned 
female at birth, but instead of the vaginal opening that mid-wives and doctors expected, he only 
had “συριγγωθέντος τόπου […] τὰς περιττώσεις τῶν ὑγρῶν ἐξέκρινεν” (a perforation 
from which [he] excreted superfluous liquids; 32.11.1). Kallon later married, but Diodorus 
speculates that, because of his non-normalised genitalia, he and his husband had sexual 
intercourse “παρὰ φύσιν” (against nature; 32.11.1). Like Diophantos, Kallon later developed 
a painful tumour on his genitals; however, none of the physicians who were called in would 
treat him (Diodorus does not state why), except for one apothecary. He “ἔτεμε τὸν 
ἐπηρμένον τόπον, ἐξ οὗπερ ἐξέπεσεν ἀνδρὸς αἰδοῖα, δίδυμοι καὶ καυλὸς ἄτρητος.” 
(cut into swollen area out of which burst forth the private parts of a male: testicles and an 
imperforate penis [one in which the urethra is below the penis]; 32.11.2). While everyone stood 
amazed, the apothecary began a complex set of surgical procedures, cutting into Kallon’s 
genitals and carving out a urethra, before stitching everything together to create a perforate 
penis. Afterwards, the apothecary demanded double pay because “αὑτὸν παρειληφέναι 
γυναῖκα νοσοῦσαν, καθεστακέναι δὲ νεανίσκον ὑγιαίνοντα” (he had received a 
diseased woman, and brought forth a healthy young man; 32.11.3). After this declaration by 
the apothecary, Kallon socially transitioned, abandoning traditionally female tasks, changing 
his name (from Kallo to Kallon), and donning men’s clothing. Interestingly, before he had 
fallen ill and developed the tumour, Kallon had been a priestess of Demeter and attended her 
women-only religious festivals. After his transition, he was prosecuted for impiety because he 








2. NORMATIVE BODIES 
2.1. CHAOS AND ORDER 
Diophantos and Kallon can thus be neatly classified as male. Diophantos is permitted to join 
the cavalry, the physicians’ examination concludes that he was always male, and he even 
declares his maleness before a jury. Kallon likewise is so unquestionably seen as male that he 
is prosecuted for impiety during a time when he himself did not know his own gender. But their 
bodies are also subject to a fluidity that changes them physically and socially from their 
previously-fixed status as women. Diophantos’ and Kallon’s experiences would thus support 
Brooke Holmes’ theory that gender in antiquity was simultaneously fixed and fluid. It is 
therefore conspicuous that Holmes never makes an in-depth study of their story as she does of 
Phaethousa and Nanno. Instead, she only acknowledges in an endnote that Diodorus’ account 
is one of three non-mythological tales detailing the transition of people assigned female at birth 
to male.9  
Perhaps she chooses to omit this story because Diodorus’ account has the potential to 
undermine her theory? Diodorus does not actually allow for fluidity, instead presenting a world 
where gender is completely fixed, in which Diophantos and Kallon were always men, merely 
disguised as women by an illness that is ultimately resolved by the restoration of normative 
bodily features. Perhaps then, rather than ‘fixed and fluid’ as Holmes suggest, it is better to 
consider cultural perceptions of gender in this period as an interplay between chaos and order. 
Physical ambiguity can exist, but only as a transitory, liminal state, and only in a culturally-
defined state of disorder that needs to be cured (like Diophantos and Kallon) or eliminated 
(Phaethousa and Nanno). Certain features, both social and physical, establish the binary of male 
and female, and anything that does not conform to these boundaries is an oddity, an error of 




                                                          
9 The other two accounts are in Liv. 24.10 and Plin. Nat. 7.4.36; Holmes 2012, 198. The endnote is attached to 
her discussion on Aristotle’s biological theory of gender, which he sees as something ultimately fixed, but with 
some room for ambiguity. See Arist. GA 766a27–28; Holmes 2012, 44. 
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2.2. AGENCY AND POWER 
Unlike in the story of Phaethousa and Nanno, we actually hear Diophantos’ individual voice. 
When Samiades returns demanding to see him, Diophantos is the first to refuse, doing so out 
of fear and shame, but nevertheless attempting to assert his agency over his own body. 
Furthermore, during the court case, he stands before the jury openly asserting his claim to 
manhood and therefore his right to dictate ownership over his own body.10 At that particular 
moment, Diophantos is still seen as a woman by his society and by the jury, and therefore his 
body is merely a possession of his father or his husband (indeed the court case is debating 
exactly that). Even Diodorus’ language emphasises this: “συνεδρευσάντων δὲ τῶν κριτῶν 
καὶ λόγων ῥηθέντων συμπαρεῖναι μὲν τῇ κρίσει τὸ ἀμφισβητούμενον σῶμα” (after 
the judges sat down and after the arguments had all been presented, the body in dispute 
appeared at the trial; 32.10.5, emphasis added). This further dehumanises Diophantos, reducing 
his existence to an ambiguous body that needs to be disputed, debated, and solved. However, 
more importantly, it symbolically emphasises the power struggle taking place in the courtroom. 
By asserting his authority over his body, Diophantos attempts to take back control of his 
existence from the husband and father who would seek to own it.  
However, as Langlands states, “the subjects of these descriptions, these ambiguous, changing 
bodies, are themselves elusive [….] We can only seem to understand the truth about their 
natures by trusting the illusory and deceptive descriptions offered to us by the authors”.11 Like 
that of Phaethousa and Nanno, Diophantos’ story is told through the voice of an author with an 
agenda, who firmly believes that gender ambiguity cannot exist, and strongly impresses this 
opinion upon his readers. Diodorus controls the story, and Diophantos thus becomes his mouth-
piece. His view of the world would never have allowed Diophantos to continue on as Samiades’ 
wife following his transformation, largely because (in Diodorus’ perspective) Diophantos is 
now a man and his marriage would result in a homosexual pairing, something that is “κατὰ 
φύσιν” (against nature; 32.10.4). Therefore, even though Diophantos actually speaks, unlike 
Phaethousa, Nanno, or Kallon, we actually lose any aspect of his individual voice, subsumed 
by the opinions of his author.  
                                                          
10 See Dover 1974, 96; Kent 2006, 87. 
11 Langlands 2002, 106. 
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Kallon is subjected to intense medical procedures, but is never heard in Diodorus’ text, his 
voice hidden behind the workings of the physicians. Brooke Holmes notes that, in ancient 
Greek medicine, there was a disconnect between the physician as “the knower, who strives to 
understand and manipulate the body, and the body itself”. Caught in between is the patient, the 
one who suffers.12 As a result, the supposedly all-knowing physician assumes power over the 
body, leaving the suffering patient in limbo, their voice silenced and lost. In both Epidemics 
and Bibliotheca Historica – even Diodorus’, which is not a medical text – the physicians remain 
prominent in the story, and the suffering patient is reduced to a useful tool indicating the 
perceived pain and danger caused by physical ambiguity. Phaethousa, Nanno, Diophantos, and 
Kallon become largely devoid of agency, individuality, and personality, subsumed into a 
framework dictating that their bodies need to be cured by the knowledge and skill of the 
physicians. Indeed, Langlands notes that Diodorus places considerable focus on the physicians’ 
“anatomical and therapeutic view of [Diophantos’] body, so that much of what we see of the 
body is through their eyes”, and thus Diophantos’ and Kallon’s transformations are 
“medicalised by focalisation through these doctors.”13 
 
2.3. MEDICALISATION 
By presenting any change from stable gender identification as something that causes damage 
and illness to the body (demonstrated by the inflammation and fevers Diophantos and Kallon 
experience) Diodorus suggests that the ‘masculinisation’ processes triggered the disease, and 
that ambiguity itself is an illness. Diophantos’ and Kallon’s transformations are thus 
immediately medicalised, their bodies subjected to the controlling powers of physicians. As 
Langlands notes, Diophantos’ genitals appear to be immediately recognisable in the courtroom, 
but nevertheless stray from ‘the norm’ enough to warrant a medical examination and surgical 
revision.14 He is not fully allowed to enter the world as a man, despite his public declaration in 
court, until his genitals conform to cultural perceptions of ‘correctness’. It is only after this that 
Diophantos is seen as occupying a stable, binary gender, and is finally allowed to change his 
name, emerging fully into society as male. Without this final medical ‘cure’, Diophantos may 
have been relegated to a lifetime of unacceptable ambiguity. 
                                                          
12 Holmes 2010, 118. 
13 Langlands 2002, 98. 
14 Langlands 2002, 102. 
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Of all four cases in Epidemics and Bibliotheca Historica, Kallon’s is perhaps the most extreme 
example of medicalisation. We have no information on Phaethousa’s and Nanno’s treatments, 
but given that surgery was not widely practiced by Hippocratic physicians, these treatments 
most likely took the form of smelling salts, vapour baths, bloodletting, or pessaries inserted 
into the vaginal canal.15 However, we are given a relatively detailed account of the surgery on 
Kallon’s imperforate penis:  
τὸ αἰδοῖον ἄκρον ἐπιτεμὼν συνέτρησεν εἰς τὸν οὐρητῆρα, καὶ καθεὶς 
ἀργυροῦν καυλίσκον ταύτῃ τὰ περιττώματα τῶν ὑγρῶν ἐξεκόμιζε, 
τὸν δὲ σεσυριγγωμένον τόπον ἑλκώσας συνέφυσε. 
cutting into the glans [the apothecary] made a passage into the urethra, and 
inserting a silver catheter drew off the liquid residues. Then, by scarifying the 
perforated area, he brought the parts together. (32.11.3) 
Kallon’s body is majorly re-sculpted because, in the eyes of Diodorus and the apothecary, he 
is in a transitionary state, and the only way for him to enter a stable gender assignment is to 
acquire genitals that unequivocally reflect normative ideals. We have no indication of Kallon’s 
own wishes; no acknowledgement of the pain he would have suffered in an era before 
anaesthesia; no idea if Kallon’s surgically reconstructed penis gave him the ability to urinate 
standing, or if it impeded sexual functioning. We have only the apothecary’s words that he 
‘received a diseased woman and sent out a healthy young man’ as any indication of the 
surgery’s success. With this insufficient explanation, Diodorus can only suggest one thing: the 
surgery was aesthetically successful in removing any ambiguity, and therefore ambiguity itself 
becomes a curable disease.  
Ambiguity remains a medical condition, with Diophantos’ and Kallon’s stories regularly 
treated as an interesting point in medical history, or a venue for revised diagnosis. In a recent 
article written by nine authors (referred to as Armeni et al.), Diophantos and Kallon are 
retrospectively identified as intersex, but with the somewhat contested term ‘Disorder of Sexual 
Difference’.16 Armeni et al. specifically identify two possible intersex variations that are linked 
to the synthesis of androgens (including testosterone): low levels of 17B3 enzymes, or 5-alpha 
                                                          
15 See Hp. Nat.Mul., 18, 23, 37, 41, 74, 77; Dean-Jones 1994, 131–133; Jones 1987, 66–67. Prior to human 
dissections in the Hellenistic period, physicians rarely operated on soft tissue (except for procedures such as 
draining of the lung); see Phillips 1973, 41, 92, 139–154.  
16 See Feder 2009, 225; Jones et al. 2016, 21, 28, 38–40. 
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reductase deficiency syndrome, the latter being the same intersex variation as Eugenides’ Cal.17 
People born with these variations have lower levels of androgens in utero, and do not develop 
many typically male primary sexual characteristics. As a result, they are commonly assigned 
female at birth. At puberty, secondary sexual characteristics usually develop that do not match 
this gender assignment – for example, Diophantos, Kallon, and Cal, are all assigned female at 
birth, but develop traditionally male secondary sexual characteristics. 
Androutsos, Papadopoulou, and Geroulanos (referred to as Androutsos et al.) also attempt to 
‘diagnose’ Diophantos and Kallon with a more general name for the specific variations 
identified by Armeni et al. – ‘male pseudo-hermaphroditism’ – which they define as a state 
characterised by the presence of chromosomes and genital glands of one gender and the 
external genitalia and secondary sexual characteristics of another. In their view, Diophantos 
and Kallon are men, born with XY chromosomes, and merely suffering a disease with a cure.18 
They do not acknowledge that gender, in reality, is far more complex than chromosomes or 
genitalia. Where does the end-point of gender occur: at the level of anatomy, chromosomes, 
and/or hormonal expression?19 Does the fact that Diophantos’ and Kallon’s bodies were 
surgically altered, and Phaethousa’s and Nanno’s were not, affect this definition? We can never 
truly know what chromosomes each of the four had. For example, sometimes people with the 
same intersex variations as Diophantos and Kallon may not develop traditionally male 
secondary sexual characteristics at puberty, and therefore may live their wholes lives 
considered to be female, despite their XY chromosomes. If this had happened to Diophantos 
and Kallon, would that change their gender? The articles by Armeni et al. and Androutsos et 
al. thus become essentialist, boiling down the physiological expression of gender – itself a 
thoroughly confusing and difficult concept to define – to this simplistic and limited form. 
Unable to see beyond this dualistic perspective, they instead consider the binary-defying 
Diophantos as Kallon as people with a ‘disorder’ or a ‘deficiency’. Thus, they further 
medicalise the story, and refuse to acknowledge the fact that the stories of Diophantos and 
Kallon profoundly challenge the long-upheld notions about physiological gender that these 
authors choose to follow.   
Although Armeni et al. and Androutsos et al. rely on simplistic ideas of gender attribution, 
namely chromosomes and external genitalia, Rhiannon Rowlands asserts that Diodorus, 
                                                          
17 Armeni et al. 2014, 581–582. 
18 Androutsos, Papadopoulou, and Geroulanos 2001, 89, 93. 
19 See Chapter 1, 7–8.  
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conversely, “undermines the dominance of the genitals for determining [gender]” when he 
argues that: 
The two natures, male and female, are not determined by body. These natures, 
which correspond to the modern concept of [social] gender, are described as 
fluid but cannot coexist equally in one person[. They] cannot be equally 
feminine and masculine at the same time. One gender must predominate. The 
body, however, can have both male parts and female parts. And the [gender] of 
a person’s body does not always correspond to his or her nature.20  
Similarly to the authors above, Rowlands separates social and physiological expressions of 
gender in order to argue that Diophantos’ and Kallon’s possession of penises – a physical trait 
typically considered to be male – only gives them the potential to become men, but that 
masculinity is something that needs to be earned and maintained in the social sphere.21 If we 
take gender as this separate concept, which I already dismissed in Chapter 1, then arguably 
Rowlands is right because the way Diophantos and Kallon are seen in society, their social 
gender, is fluid and changes. Moreover, when comparing Diophantos to his former husband 
Samiades, who died pining for his failed marriage, Diodorus states “ὥστε τὴν μὲν γυναῖκα 
γεγενημένην ἀνδρὸς ἀναλαβεῖν δόξαν καὶ τόλμαν, τὸν δ᾿ ἄνδρα γυναικείας 
ψυχῆς ἀσθενέστερον γενέσθαι.” (so one who was born a woman took up a man’s renown 
and courage, but the man was more feeble-minded than a woman; 32.10.9). Samiades, although 
possessing a ‘male’ body as Diodorus would see it, does not perform masculinity correctly, 
losing himself to his “παρὰ φύσιν γάμου” (unnatural marriage; 32.10.9). Diophantos, on the 
other hand, was initially thought to be female with only the potential for femininity before his 
transformation, and he goes on to earn “a man’s renown and courage”. A body merely gives 
the potential, but successful performance and maintenance of masculinity is up to the 
individual.  
                                                          
20 Rowlands 2014, 43. Suzanne Kessler and Wendy McKenna designed a sociological study that required 
participants to ask up to ten yes-or-no questions (including questions about genitalia, but excluding ‘is this person 
male, female, a man, or a woman’) to determine the gender of a person the examiner was thinking of. 
Overwhelmingly, Kessler and McKenna found that the figures with a penis were immediately and confidently 
labelled as male, even if this gendering was incorrect. Kessler and McKenna concluded that the penis became in 
many ways essential in gender determination. See Kessler and McKenna 2006, 170–173. 
21 Rowlands 2014, 42–43. Masculinity was considered something that needed to be earned and maintained; see 
Arist. GA 728a17–25, 746b33–747a4, 766a21–30, 775a14–20; Hp. Morb. 4.45; Gleason 1990, 392–406; Holmes 
2012, 79–81, 110–128. 
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Yet, for Diodorus, it is not so much the potential but the expectation that a person with a penis 
would wish to be a man and, like Diophantos, strive for masculine excellence. Contrary to 
Rowlands’ opinion, social gender for Diodorus is entirely determined by the body. If he did 
not believe this, then he could, for instance, have depicted Diophantos continuing to live 
happily as Samiades’ wife. Thus Rowlands is correct in only one respect: for Diodorus, one 
gender must predominate. Diophantos and Kallon cannot exist in an ambiguous state in which 
a person with a penis lives as the wife of a man (Diophantos) or a penis exists in an imperforate, 
and therefore ‘imperfect’, form (Kallon). These situations would present a challenge to social 
norms and must be socially or surgically ‘rectified’.  
Conversely, as Androutsos et al. state, Diophantos only required a ‘small’ surgical procedure 
to induce healing. Yet what this means is to induce healing correctly, and therefore remove the 
‘challenge’ that his ambiguous body presents to cultural norms. Moreover, they argue that 
Diodorus positions his readers to admire the work of the apothecary who acted as surgeon, 
celebrating his skill.22 This story becomes one of human success against ‘errors of nature’. Yet 
neither Diodorus, nor Androutsos et al., consider the implications of the surgeries: would 
Diophantos’ and Kallon’s genital functions or general happiness have been impacted? How 
would pain have been dealt with (and was it)? In addition, none of them consider the challenges 
Diophantos and Kallon could face in social and legal systems that do not necessarily 
acknowledge and accept gender ambiguity or transition. They all thus show little consideration 
of Diophantos’ and Kallon’s personal experience, instead focusing only on the medical aspects 
of their tale, their ‘wrong’ ambiguous bodies, and the medical skill that ‘corrects’ them.  
Stephanie van der Gracht, conversely, argues that Diodorus shows not only an awareness of 
intersex natures (she, like others, specifically names ‘male pseudo-hermaphroditism’), but also 
compassion for their struggles. In 32.12, he discusses violence perpetrated against one intersex 
person in Athens and another in Rome, who were both burnt alive simply for the make-up of 




                                                          
22 Androutsos, Papadopoulou, and Geroulanos 2001, 90.  
50 
 
Diodorus demonstrated his empathy […] when he went on to say the following: 
‘Thus did one whose nature was like ours and who was not, in reality, a monster, 
meet an unsuitable end through misunderstanding of his malady’? He 
demonstrated his understanding again, when he emphasizes that the 
hermaphrodite in Athens was burnt alive because of a ‘misunderstanding of the 
affliction’.23 
However, it is ignorance and “misunderstanding” that Diodorus emphasises – in the original 
Greek he states that they perished because of “ἀγνοίᾳ τῆς νόσου” (ignorance of the disease; 
32.12.2) – rather than his compassion and sensitivity for their plight. He does not sympathise 
with the victims who, in both the Roman and Athenian cases, are abandoned by their 
communities and condemned to a painful death, simply because their bodies do not conform to 
socially-mediated ideas of ‘normality’.  Similarly, in the stories of Diophantos and Kallon, 
Diodorus shows little compassion. Diophantos’ and Kallon’s sex lives are questioned, with 
family, household servants, and Diodorus himself disapproving of them for allegedly engaging 
in same-gender intercourse; their personal experience of the surgeries, any difficulties they may 
face adjusting to society anew, and details of Kallon’s trial are all passed over precisely because 
Diodorus’ main concern is not to urge his readers to show compassion. Instead, in all accounts 
– Diophantos, Kallon, and Roman and Athenian examples – Diodorus seeks to deny that gender 
ambiguity can exist as anything other than an illness that can be ‘cured’ by medical skill. 
Diophantos and Kallon exist primarily to bolster these claims because their stories are not 
accounts of ignorance. Instead, Diodorus presents them as medical ‘success stories’, 
celebrating the power of physicians, and ignores the pressures faced by those who do not 
conform to socially-normative ‘intelligible’ genders.   
 
2.4. HUMANITY AND MONSTROSITY  
As Susan Stryker notes, “encounters with gender-changing or gender-challenging people can 
sometimes feel for others like an encounter with a monstrous and frightening unhumanness”, 
and she goes on to ask why non-normalised expressions of gender are not more often 
approached with curiosity or delight.24 The attempts to re-establish normative ideas on 
Diophantos’ and Kallon’s bodies are largely a reaction to their ‘otherness’, an attempt to make 
                                                          
23 Van der Gracht 2009, 252. 
24 Stryker 2017, 8. 
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their ambiguity culturally intelligible. Interestingly, this view betrays an anxiety and 
discomfort with ambiguity. As Luc Brisson states, ancient Greeks and Romans 
seemed to have scanned their newborn children anxiously for signs that might 
indicate that the human race was no longer as it should be and was on the way 
to extinction. And no mutation was more radical than dual sexuality. For the 
possession of both [genders] at once rendered all sexual reproduction 
impossible and undermined all life as a couple and a family – and even all social 
organization since, at the time, the latter rested on a strict division of roles and 
functions that was […] founded on [gender] difference.25 
Gender ambiguity would threaten the very models that patriarchal ancient Greek society was 
built on, and the gender norms required to create and maintain this system. It is interesting that 
Brisson’s assessment forms the introduction to a chapter entitled ‘Monsters’, the same chapter 
in which he examines the story of Diophantos and Kallon. Diodorus also draws on this long-
enduring connection between ambiguous bodies and monstrosity, speaking about ambiguous 
beings in 32.12 with the word ‘τέρας’ (teras; marvel, wonder, sign), the equivalent of the Latin 
monstrum, from which our word ‘monster’ comes.26 The word does not necessarily have the 
same connotation as a modern monster, which is an aberration of nature, usually a creature of 
terror; instead it primarily references a connection to divine or supernatural forces. Diodorus 
uses it in this way to emphasise that people like Diophantos and Kallon are not omens of danger 
that need to be destroyed to ensure the survival of the community. However, Diodorus’ 
translators will almost unquestionably render this word ‘monster’ in modern translations of the 
text, perpetuating the long-enduring link between gender ambiguity and monstrosity.27  
Indeed, these concepts often become practically synonymous. For instance, upon learning of 
his intersex nature, Eugenides’ Cal goes searching in a late-twentieth-century edition of 
Webster’s dictionary to better understand terms used by his doctors, discovering: 
hermaphrodite –1. One having the [genitals] and many of the secondary sex 
characteristics of both male and female. 2. Anything comprised of a 
combination of diverse or contradictory elements. See synonyms at MONSTER.28 
                                                          
25 Brisson 2002, 7.  
26 LSJ Online ‘τέρας’. Cf. Roscoe 1996, 204. 
27 See Goukowsky 2012, fr. 34.14 (Loeb 32.12.2) = p.215; Walton 1957, 32.12.2 = p.457. See also Eckert 2003, 
17–19; Epstein 1990, 102, 106–114; King 2016, 82; Stryker 2006, 13. 
28 Eugenides 2002, 430. 
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People like Cal, Diophantos, and Kallon, as well as Phaethousa and Nanno, thus become seen 
as figures of mystery and fear, embodiments of chaos that have the power to challenge the 
established ‘order’ of binary genders. All those outside these norms are considered somehow 
monstrous and unnatural, because normalised bodies are a prerequisite for existing in a 
particular society without encountering personal, physical, or legal crises. Cultural norms thus 
limit the study of gender ambiguity, medicalising gender ambiguity and fixing it in history as 
an ‘error of nature’, the embodiment of cultural and social disorder. 
 
3. TEMPORALITY 
3.1. NORMATIVE TIME, QUEER TIME 
Time also exists in this dichotomy of chaos and order during Diophantos’ and Kallon’s 
transitions. Initially, they both begin within the constraints of a normative female life: born and 
subject to their fathers, then married when they reached the standard age for procreation, 
moving into the world of female adulthood. Their lives thus follow the linear progression 
typical for ancient Greek women. However, when their bodies spontaneously change, not only 
are they made ambiguous, but their comfortable timeline is shattered. They are unable to move 
forward with their lives in a socially-normative manner because of their ‘incorrect’ ambiguous 
bodies, but also unable to revert to their previous stable state. They thus enter a queer 
chronological space, in which life can be lived and progress, but not according to socially-
mediated conceptions of ‘normality’. In Diodorus’ view, Diophantos is one half of an 
‘unnatural’ marriage because he is a person with a penis, but conducting himself as a man’s 
wife. He is thus is incapable of procreation, and therefore cannot complete normative life 
expectations for an ancient Greek wife. Similarly, Kallon would be unable to carry or conceive 
a child, neither before nor after his transformation. Both Diophantos and Kallon are caught in 
a limbo, unable to fulfil the cultural expectations placed on them because of their physical 
ambiguity. However, when the doctors surgically restore normative order on their bodies, they 
set their lives on the ‘correct’ path, on a timeline that is culturally intelligible. Thus, 
Diophantos’ and Kallon’s timelines change, moving from normative (femininity) to queer 
(ambiguity) and back into a different, ordered state (maleness) in which life can once again 
progress in a normative, linear, culturally-intelligible fashion. 
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However, do any changes actually occur? As Langlands states: “it is not clear at which 
particular moment in the narrative [Diophantos] actually becomes a man … Neither is it clear 
what sort of man [he] has become, nor if [he] was ever really a woman in the first place.”29 
Diodorus, for instance, believes that Diophantos was always a man whose masculine potential 
was merely ‘hidden’ by some fortuitously developed folds of skin. Arguably then, he was never 
experiencing a normative course of life for a female, but he began from a state of disorder as 
the wife of another man. We could also interpret this period of his life in the context of the 
widely-known ancient Greek same-gender relationship, in which an older man (erastes) took a 
pre-pubescent boy (eromenos) under his wing. Children were generally not differentiated by 
gender, and even authors like Aristotle consider children and women to belong to the same 
category.30 However, once a boy began growing facial hair, thus reaching puberty, he gained a 
higher social status, and it was in puberty that relationships with an erastes were expected to 
end.31 Similarly, Diophantos is much like an eromenos prior to his physical transition, arguably 
pre-pubescent and without the higher social status of an adult citizen man. When he physically 
develops, also transitioning socially into male adulthood, any relationship with his husband – 
his erastes – ends. Unlike Phaethousa and Nanno, who experienced puberty without any social 
or legal changes, Diophantos’ transition pushes him onto a normative timeline in which he 
experiences ‘correct’ puberty and an ‘appropriate’ physical and social transition into adulthood. 
This was not a case of switching between different timelines, but rather one in which 
Diophantos was always on a path that would result in normative time being reinstated. 
Kallon, however, always started from a state of chronological chaos. His body is ambiguous 
from birth, assigned female simply because it appears to be the most appropriate option. 
Although he is married and arguably following a typical course of life for an ancient Greek 
woman, the speculation surrounding his sexual life immediately identifies his marriage as non-
normative. Moreover, unlike Diophantos who himself declares his masculinity before entering 
the male sphere of his society, the apothecary makes this declaration on Kallon’s behalf. Less 
a pubertal shift, Kallon’s rather is forcibly reborn into the ‘correct’ body by the apothecary 
who, physically and socially, delivers him to the world. This rebirth comes with a new name 
and a change of clothes, reinstating normative time on him as he fully enters society as a newly-
born, adult man.  
                                                          
29 Langlands 2002, 102. 
30 See Arist. GA. 728a17. 
31 Dover 1989, 43–59; Dover 2002, 25–29; Halperin 1990, 19–21, 55. 
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Diophantos’ and Kallon’s lives thus transition from the chronological mess of childhood 
(Diophantos) or the temporal dissonance of physical ambiguity (Kallon) into the neat and 
ordered lifetime of an adult man. They both thus leave a queer temporal space and move into 
one of cisheteronormativity – a term denoting a world-view that presupposes all parties to be 
cisgender (i.e. non-transgender) and heterosexual.32 It dismisses ambiguity of physiology, 
variability of gender expression, and diversity of sexual attraction, in order to maintain its strict 
boundaries of ‘normality’. Diophantos and Kallon both find cisheteronormative boundaries 
forced upon them. Diophantos’ fear and shame at his marriage to a man, the speculation about 
his past sexual history, and Diodorus’ assumptions about Kallon’s sexual exploits clearly 
indicate a heteronormative view of the world in which traditional heterosexual models must be 
reinforced. Moreover, the obsession Diodorus and the physicians have with ‘correcting’ 
Diophantos’ and Kallon’s genitals (and their confusion at Kallon’s genital make-up at birth) 
reflect cis-normative ideals of physical expression, which designate their bodies as culturally 
unintelligible. When the ambiguity of their bodies is removed, and their lives set on an 
‘appropriate’ track, Diophantos and Kallon thus become subject to the limits of 
cisheteronormative time, which does not allow them to exist with diverse sexual attractions or 
ambiguous physical features.  
However, although they become bound by cisheteronormativity, both Diophantos and Kallon 
are never truly separated from queer experiences of time. For example, they had both already 
reached adulthood, as adult women not men, when they go through their respective puberty 
and rebirth. Therefore, even after normative time is thrust upon them, their lives are in fact 
lived queerly; they become defined by their difference. As Langlands notes, if Diophantos had 
truly been considered always male, 
there would have been no transformation in the way the story encourages us to 
see it. There would be the physical coexistence of the two sexes persisting 
throughout in [Diophantos’] body, with the change taking place [only] on the 
level of clothing and social role.33  
Although she addresses this to highlight the lack of clarity in the story (as we can never be sure 
if and when any transformations happen) she nevertheless raises an important point. If there 
had been no transformation element, no non-normativity, then perhaps Diophantos’ and 
                                                          
32 See OED ‘heteronormative’; Cole 2018, 22–23; Marzetti 2017, 702–703, 717. 
33 Langlands 2002, 102. 
55 
 
Kallon’s stories would not have been told. They are thus eternally placed in the category of 
social and culture ‘others’.  
Translators have continued to retain this ‘othering’ perspective. Despite fixating heavily on 
their physical transitions, many refuse to acknowledge Diophantos’ and Kallon’s male identity. 
The principal English translator Francis Walton does not honour the original text; for instance, 
when Diodorus states that, “τὴν δ᾿ Ἡραΐδα μετονομασθεῖσαν Διόφαντον εἰς τοὺς 
ἱππεῖς καταλεχθῆναι, καὶ σὺν τῷ βασιλεῖ παραταξάμενον εἰς τὰς Ἄβας 
συναναχωρῆσαι” (Heraïs, changing her name to Diophantos, was enrolled in the cavalry 
and he was posted side-by-side with the king on his withdrawal to Abai; 32.10.8, emphasis 
added). Diodorus makes use of the masculine participle ‘παραταξάμενον’ (parataxamenon; 
he was posted side-by-side) just after Diophantos has entered the cavalry, fully acknowledging 
him as a man in his own right, and he even continues to refer to ‘Diophantos’, rather than 
‘Heraïs’ from that moment on. Walton, however, shies away from specificity, translating this 
event as “Heraïs, changing her name to Diophantus, was enrolled in the cavalry, and after 
fighting in the king’s forces accompanied him in his withdrawal to Abae.”34 He thus makes 
‘Heraïs’ the subject of the masculine participle ‘parataxamenon’, choosing not to emphasise 
Diophantos’ change in social gender, and thus changing Diodorus’ original meaning. Similarly, 
French translator Paul Goukowsky even purposely misgenders Diophantos, by inserting the 
feminine pronoun ‘elle’, translating it as “elle fit retraite avec lui vers Abai” (she retired with 
him to Abai).35  
Furthermore, historians rarely name them Diophantos and Kallon, as they are most regularly 
known as Heraïs and Kallo, and referred to with ‘she’ pronouns: two ‘women’ who ‘became 
men’.36 Even receptions in medical texts like Armeni et al. or Androutsos et al., they are still 
called Heraïs and Kallo, even though both articles consider them, on biologically essentialist 
terms, to be male. Diophantos and Kallon thus consistently become defined by difference; 
despite any assertions that they were always male, they go down in history not for entering a 
normative world, but for their physical and chronological queerness. Moreover, neither one of 
                                                          
34 Walton 1957, 32.10.8 = p.451. 
35 Goukowsky 2012, 32.10.8  = p.217. 
36 Rowlands is one of the very few who uses the names ‘Diophantos’ and ‘Kallon’ to refer to them post-transition, 
sometimes also referring to them with ‘he/she’, a pronoun variant that has largely been replaced by the gender-
neutral singular ‘they’. However, apart from instances where she needs to make specific reference to pre- and 
post-transition states, she will still refer to them as ‘Heraïs and Kallo’. See Rowlands 2014, 42–43. 
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them is permitted to exist in their society as ambiguous, nor are they able to return to their 
previous state. In order to be considered ‘normal’ or even ‘real’ by their societies, they thus 
become dependent on the actions of dominant authorities, who dictate the progress of their 
lives and artificially (re)construct their past, present, and future. Therefore, both Diophantos 
and Kallon occupy a queer chronological space, simultaneously existing inside and outside 
cisheteronormative time. As a result, the human-made, re-sculpted bodies of Kallon and 
Diophantos clearly highlight the artificiality of cultural norms. Time is not something 
inherently natural, but rather can be manipulated and changed by human intervention. The 
account of Diophantos and Kallon thus demonstrates how boundaries are created and 
maintained, ensuring that ambiguity is always presented as ‘other’.  
 
3.2. TRANS AND INTERSEX: WORDS OF POWER 
In many ways, Diophantos’ and Kallon’s complex, queer experience of time and gender reflects 
the experiences of modern intersex and trans people, who likewise exist outside normative 
structures of time and normalised ideas of the body. Diophantos, for instance, openly declares 
his gender in a court of law, effectively ‘coming out’ to his society, and chooses to change his 
clothing following the trial. Although he has greater ability to define his own gender than 
Phaethousa, Nanno, or Kallon, I have already questioned how much power he truly possesses, 
being constrained by the social norms of his society, and how much of his desire to transition 
is truly his own. Even if we examine his declaration from a different perspective, seeing it as 
his own wish and not one controlled by the powers of social normativity, Diophantos 
nevertheless has little autonomy over his own transition. He states his gender to a jury, forced 
to publicly lay bare vulnerable aspects of his life to legal authorities, who then can decide if he 
will be allowed to exist in society as male. Similarly, modern trans people are required to reveal 
vulnerable aspects of their medical history, physical anatomy, and psychological state to 
strangers who can dictate their ability to exist authentically. Clearly, the power to legally 
declare someone a different gender to their gender assigned at birth does not lie with the person 
in question.  
However, Diophantos’ legal transition is not completed after the public declaration, because 
the physicians first insist on examining him and making surgical alterations to his body. The 
dominant legal and medical structures that are defined by binary gender norms become 
57 
 
threatened when presented with people who are gender-diverse. Today, for instance, around 60 
countries around the world have procedures for changing a person’s legal gender, but 
approximately half require some type of surgical intervention and/or sterilisation to update a 
person’s gender markers on their legal documents.37 In order to actually legally and socially be 
permitted to exist, a trans person is required to fit into certain arbitrary criteria that dictates how 
their body should look and act. Diophantos, for instance, changes his name and enters the army 
only after both the legal declaration and surgical intervention. This clearly indicates that ideas 
about physical normativity must be resolved first, only after that will authorities allow him to 
seemingly break social norms and transition to a different gender than the one he was assigned 
at birth. Any way we interpret his gender declaration in court, he always loses agency. 
Moreover, Diophantos’ and Kallon’s cases are some of the earliest, outside mythology, that 
explore physical ambiguity and society’s attempts ‘normalise’ it. They are the progenitors in a 
long line of intersex people who, even today, are regularly subjected to surgeries and medical 
procedures aimed at ‘correcting’ their genitals and bringing their bodies in line with cultural 
perceptions of ‘normality’. Indeed, Androutsos et al. note that Diophantos’ and Kallon’s is the 
first recorded example of intersex medical intervention.38 These procedures can take the form 
of hormone replacements, and, like Kallon, extensive genital surgeries, which usually require 
numerous subsequent surgeries and are most often performed when the person is a child or 
infant (and therefore without their consent). Similarly, in Diodorus’ account, there is no 
indication that Kallon’s opinion was considered before his body was subjected to extensive 
surgery; it is the physician who exercises the right to re-sculpt Kallon’s body. These surgeries 
often do more harm than good, with intersex individuals reporting decreased sexual interest 
and activity, as well as increased pain, scarring, and loss of sensation in genital regions, factors 
that neither Diodorus nor the apothecary take into consideration.39 Modern commentators 
similarly pass over these concerns, which is surprising given that around 90% of all intersex 
infants are assigned female at birth and have their genitalia surgically altered accordingly; these 
surgeries can result in infertility for certain intersex variations, particularly those in which 
children appear anatomically ‘female’ but have internal testes, as Diophantos and Kallon are 
believed to have had.40 This designation of ‘female’ as a default is largely based on the length 
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of erectile tissue (penis/clitoris), and if less than an inch long, the person is normally assigned 
female at birth and subjected to ‘feminising’ surgeries.41 For Kallon, this arbitrary measure of 
erectile tissue was observed, albeit in the opposite direction. Although imperforate and 
therefore intersex, his genitalia were considered of an acceptable enough ‘male’ length to 
warrant surgery and bring it closer to a socially-normalised state. Previously, his life existed in 
chaos, unable to progress to any normative space of adulthood. Only after his extensive surgery, 
when his genitals conformed to a very narrow view of what is ‘correct’ according to the 
apothecary and those authorising his actions, was Kallon able to enter society as male.  
Yet, Diophantos’ and Kallon’s story also demonstrates the artificiality and fragility of these 
socially-normative boundaries when they break from one linear timeline to another, from one 
binary gender to another. This is particularly powerful, because it shows that two supposedly 
stable constructs, gender and time, can be completely shattered, traversed, and re-formed by 
both human and natural means. When their bodies change initially, moving into realms of 
chronological and physical ambiguity, dominant authorities panic. They jump into action, 
finding medical solutions that can re-establish stability (surgeries), and finding legal solutions 
to deal with the repercussions (prosecuting Kallon, for instance). Diophantos and Kallon 
‘become’ men because, in the eyes of these dominant voices, this is far less terrifying than 
acknowledging that Diophantos and Kallon have the incredible power to entirely destabilise 
and deconstruct the notion that only two ‘natural’ genders truly exist. Instead, powerful 
authorities prefer to establish new rules, new timelines, and gate-keep the boundaries of gender 
in order to convince themselves that they have some control over these chaotic bodies. As a 
result, these dominant voices (the jury, the physicians, Diodorus) give Diophantos and Kallon 
the language with which to live their lives – they are men, rather than hermaphroditoi; they 
have an ‘egg-like sac’ or flaps of skin hiding their ‘true’ gender; they are ‘errors of nature’, 
who have been ‘corrected’.  
When we introduce words like ‘trans’ and ‘intersex’ into the narrative of Diophantos and 
Kallon, we can defy these social pressures and shame that rule their stories, and defy the voices 
of dominant authorities that try to speak for them. Interestingly, words like ‘trans’ and 
‘intersex’ exist simultaneously inside and outside normative conceptions of gender and time, 
just as Diophantos and Kallon do themselves. But we cannot define these terms without social 
normativity, without relying on words such as ‘masculine’ or ‘feminine’, ‘male’ or ‘female’, 
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and without concepts such as a ‘second’ puberty or a gender assignment that happens later in 
life. Yet, they also provide us the language with which to speak about gender ambiguity, 
carving out a space in which ambiguity and non-conformity can be normalised, giving 
Diophantos and Kallon the opportunity to ‘queer’ gender, and question the rhetoric that depicts 
the ambiguity and fluidity of their bodies as medical conditions that need cures. These words, 
rather paradoxically, are simultaneously limited by, but can also liberate us from, binary gender 
and linear time. 
Moreover, Diophantos and Kallon constantly reappear in history in various later receptions 
where they are examined through the lens of modern, rather than ancient, medicine.  They recur 
through time to present a constant challenge to arbitrary social norms – even when those norms 
have evolved from their ancient roots – thus existing inside and outside traditional history. 
They become not historical figures bound by the strictures of their own timeline, but 
unhistorical figures who act as a useful site for medical and sociological re-examination. 
Perhaps more so that Phaethousa and Nanno, Diophantos and Kallon are able to constantly 
challenge strongly held cultural assumptions about gender and time. Unlike their Hippocratic 
counterparts, Diophantos and Kallon exist inside of gender because they are identifiable as 
women and as men, but also simultaneously exist as neither because of their natural ambiguity. 
If Phaethousa and Nanno are able to challenge the idea that gender ambiguity is an ‘unnatural’, 
transient state, Diophantos and Kallon are able to take this further, questioning the inherent 
‘naturalness’ of binary gender norms. They are thus perfectly positioned to question the 
arbitrary constructs they simultaneously conform to and challenge.  
 
4. CONCLUSION: ‘NORMALITY’ ISN’T NORMAL 
The stories of Diophantos and Kallon thoroughly question the idea of ‘normality’. Is 
‘normality’ normal because of some inherent naturalness, or is it normal because humans have 
arbitrarily designated it so? As beings who both defy and conform to arbitrary modes of gender 
and chronological ‘normality’, their story becomes one of perhaps stronger control, and subtler 
resistance to social norms, than that of Phaethousa and Nanno. Diophantos and Kallon do not 
eternally defy classification, and can even be categorised in intelligible genders; where 
Phaethousa and Nanno exist outside binary gender norms, Diophantos and Kallon appear to 
exist firmly within them. However, implicit in their story is the breaking of boundaries between 
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male and female, past and present, ancient and modern. They are immediately identified as 
‘other’, demonstrated by several factors including: the natural ambiguity of their bodies, their 
eternal classification as Heraïs and Kallo (as people who were ‘born women’), and their gender 
transitions – they are ‘the same, but different’. By simultaneously conforming to and subverting 
gender expectations, they show how arbitrary, limiting, and fragile the human concepts of 
gender and time are, and firmly highlight humanity’s obsession with creating an artificially 
constructed system of order. With this analysis they thus become, to borrow Leslie Feinberg’s 
term, ‘transgender (and intersex) warriors’, breaking down the cultural barriers that restrict 
their existence from the inside. 
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CONCLUSION: QUEER CHALLENGERS 
These [stories I’ve presented] are not meant to imply that the individuals 
pictured identify themselves as transgender in the modern, Western sense of the 
word. Instead, I’ve presented their images as a challenge to the currently 
accepted Western dominant view that woman and man are all that exist, and that 
there is only one way to be a woman or man.1 
Just as Leslie Feinberg specifies in hir exploration of transgender figures in ‘Western’ history, 
I likewise do not mean to imply that Phaethousa, Nanno, Diophantos, and Kallon unequivocally 
are trans and/or intersex. Instead, I aim to convey that the methods of control they are forced 
to submit to, as well as the systematic erasure they experience, resonates with modern trans 
and intersex experiences. Presently and historically, gender ambiguity has been treated as a 
medical illness or a transitory state, a ‘phase’ before a stable and ‘intelligible’ gender can be 
reinstated on the body. Phaethousa and Nanno, for instance, never pass beyond this transitory 
state as they are unable to be ‘cured’, and therefore, do not survive. Similarly, Diophantos’ and 
Kallon’s naturally-occurring ambiguity is seen as an illness, left in the hands of medical and 
judicial authorities to rectify so that they express culturally-intelligible genders. However, for 
all four, the initial transition into ambiguity in fact happened naturally, thus challenging any 
inherent ‘naturalness’ of binary gender norms. 
We can thus see how social normativity can limit our understanding of gender ambiguity and 
queerness, as well as time and history. Phaethousa, Nanno, Diophantos, and Kallon all exist 
outside normative time and gender, thus clearly outside the boundaries of their own (and later) 
cultures’ perception of ‘normal’. In Epidemics, Phaethousa’s and Nanno’s ambiguous bodies 
push them onto a non-normative timeline, in which they experience a ‘second’ puberty, die too 
young, and also reappear throughout history as a gender ‘problem’ to solve. Likewise, 
Diophantos’ and Kallon’s story is revisited by later scholars intent on ‘diagnosing’ their 
ambiguity with updated modern methods. Their stories are thus not locked into a linear 
framework, existing in Queer Time and consequently unbound from the strictures of traditional 
history. There is therefore no reason not to use anachronistic language in analysis, which can 
help us better understand the cultural constraints placed upon them. Phaethousa, Nanno, 
Diophantos, and Kallon thoroughly queer the concept of time by becoming almost achronistic 
beings – separated from their own historical period by their cultural otherness – as well as 
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moving across (trans) and existing in between (inter) blocks of normative time. Words like 
‘trans’, ‘intersex’, and ‘non-binary’ can acknowledge this, as well as highlighting the restrictive 
ideas about ‘correct’ bodies that see Phaethousa and Nanno subjected to ‘feminising’ treatment, 
and Diophantos and Kallon to major surgeries, just like their modern counterparts. They all 
could be trans and/or intersex, but that is not the point.  
Instead, these words become significant because they allow us to understand that Phaethousa 
and Nanno eternally defy categorisation, existing in the ‘grey area’ of gender and time, 
prompting us to re-examine the binary gendered language that we would otherwise apply to 
the ancient world without question. Gender is not a stable concept, and as long as we keep 
problematising ambiguity, we will never be able to acknowledge the inherent fluidity and 
instability that gender contains. Diophantos and Kallon similarly demonstrate humanity’s 
obsession with order and preserving culturally-constructed social norms of ‘naturalness’, even 
when nature itself defies them. Normally, these cultural constructs form the basis for arguments 
that would seek to systematically erase the existence of queer people and limit their rights. 
Diophantos’ and Kallon’s transitions, for instance, are dictated by medical and legal authorities 
who control if, when, and how they are permitted to transition. Similarly, Phaethousa and 
Nanno are denied any change in legal status, instead subjected to treatments aimed at returning 
their bodies to a recognisable ‘female’ state. Yet if gender is socially-constructed, they why 
should these institutions, in both the ancient and modern worlds, care that ambiguity and 
transition upset gender binary norms? If time is non-linear, why must we turn to history as a 
paragon of truth?  
Phaethousa, Nanno, Diophantos, and Kallon truly critique a historical narrative that erases 
queer gender, fundamentally questioning whether there is only one way to be a man or a 
woman, and if ‘man’ and ‘woman’ are really all that have existed in the past. Contrary to 
popular imagination, they all indicate that gender ambiguity, non-conformity, and transition 
are not purely modern concepts, but have always existed in history. They reveal gender and 
time, and by extension history itself, as social constructs that are inherently unstable. 
Ambiguity itself thus becomes almost more powerful that normativity, able to critically 
question the culturally imposed barriers society upholds. If we cannot see beyond our own 
cultural blindfolds, how can we see how society has evolved, is evolving, or will evolve to 
better understand the complexity of gender? Instead, through queer unhistoricist analysis and 
the use of anachronistic language, we can clearly see these arguments against gender 
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ambiguity, transition, and non-conformity are often the result of fear: a fear of chaos, of the 
breakdown of comfortable social norms. Instead, it would be better to embrace gender 
ambiguity, exploring it rather than seeking to control it. This would allow us to move beyond 
the strict boundaries of social normativity, leading us to clearly comprehend the limits we have 
placed upon ourselves, and fully accept ambiguity as a fundamental part of our past, present, 






Anagnostopoulos, A. 2017. ‘Change, Agency and the Incomplete in Aristotle.’ Phronesis 
62:170–209. 
Anagnostopoulos, A.H. 2007. Aristotle on Change and Potentiality. Doctor of Philosophy, 
University of California. 
Androutsos, G. 2006. ‘Hermaphroditism in Greek and Roman antiquity.’ Hormones 5 (3):214–
217. 
Androutsos, G., M. Papadopoulou, and S. Geroulanos. 2001. ‘Les premières opérations de 
changement de sexe dans l’antiquité.’ Andrologie 11 (2):89–93. 
Apter, E. 2013. Against World Literature: On the Politics of Untranslatability. London: Verso. 
Armeni, A.K., V. Vasileiou, G. Markantes, C. Damoulari, A. Mandrapilia, F.A. Kosmopoulou, 
V. Keramisanou, D. Georgakopoulou, and N.A. Georgopoulos. 2014. ‘Gender identity 
disputed in the court of justice: a story of female to male sexual transformation in the 
hellenistic period, described by Diodorus Siculus.’ Hormones 13 (4):579–582. 
Baron, D.E. 1981. ‘The Epicene Pronoun: The Word That Failed.’ American Speech 56 (2):83–
97. 
Bevir, M. 2011. ‘Why Historical Distance Is Not A Problem.’ History and Theory 50 (4):24–
37. 
Boag, P. 2005. ‘Go West Young Man, Go East Young Woman: Searching for the Trans in 
Western Gender History.’ Western Historically Quarterly 36 (4):477–497. 
Brisson, L. 2002. Sexual Ambivalence: Androgyny and Hermaphroditism in Graeco-Roman 
Antiquity. Translated by J. Lloyd. Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California 
Press. 
Brulé, P. 2003. Women of Ancient Greece. Translated by A. Nevill. Edinburgh: Edinburgh 
University Press. 
Butler, J. 1999. Gender Trouble: Feminism and the Subversion of Identity. New York: 
Routledge. 
———. 2004. Undoing Gender. New York: Routledge. 
———. 2014. ‘Gender and Gender Trouble.’ In Dictionary of Untranslatables: A   
Philosophical Lexicon, edited by B. Cassin, E. Apter, J. Lezra and M. Wood. Princeton: 




Butler, S. 2016. ‘Homer’s Deep.’ In Deep Classics: Rethinking Classical Reception, edited by 
S. Butler. London: Bloomsbury Academic. 
———, ed. 2016. Deep Classics: Rethinking Classical Reception. London: Bloomsbury 
Academic. 
Carson, A. 1990. ‘Putting Her in Her Place: Woman, Dirt, and Desire.’ In Before Sexuality: 
The Construction of Erotic Experience in the Ancient Greek World, edited by D.M. 
Halperin, J.J. Winkler and F.I. Zeitlin. Princeton University Press: Princeton. 
Champagne, J. 2013. ‘Forum: Foucault and Queer (Un)Historicism.’ PMLA 128 (4):1005–
1006. 
Charles, D. 2017. ‘Aristotle on Agency.’ Oxford Handbooks Online:1–31. 
Chase, C. 2006. ‘Hermaphrodites with Attitude: Mapping the Emergence of Intersex Political 
Activism.’ In The Transgender Studies Reader, edited by S. Stryker and S. Whittle. 
New York: Routledge. 
Chiam, Z., S. Duffy, and M. González Gil. 2017. ‘Trans Legal Mapping Report: Recognition 
before the Law.’ the International Lesbian, Gay, Bisexual, Trans and Intersex 
Association (ILGA). 
Cohen, J.J. 1996. ‘Monster Culture (Seven Theses).’ In Monster Theory: Reading Culture, 
edited by J.J. Cohen. Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press. 
Cole, J.B. 2018. ‘Dys-appearing/Re-Appearing: Trans Men Actors Resisting Cisnormative 
Theatrical Traditions with Phenomenal Stage Presence.’ Queer Cats Journal of LGBTQ 
Studies 2 (1):13–33. 
Connell, R., and R. Pearse. 2015. Gender: In World Perspective. Cambridge: Polity Press. 
Creighton, S. 2001. ‘Surgery for Intersex.’ Journal of the Royal Society of Medicine 94 
(5):218–220. 
David-Ménard, M., and P. Deutscher. 2014. ‘Gender.’ In Dictionary of Untranslatables: A 
Philosophical Lexicon, edited by B. Cassin, E. Apter, J. Lezra and M. Wood. Princeton: 
Princeton University Press. 
Dean-Jones, L. 1994. Women’s Bodies in Classical Greek Science. Oxford: Clarendon Press. 
———. 2003. ‘The Cultural Construct of the Female Body in Classical Greek Science.’ In Sex 
and Difference in Ancient Greece and Rome, edited by M. Golden and P. Toohey. 
Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press. 
Delcourt, M. 1961. Hermaphrodite: Myths and Rites of the Bisexual Figure in Classical 
Antiquity. Translated by J. Nicholson. London: Studio Books. 
66 
 
Dinshaw, C., L. Edelman, R.A. Ferguson, C. Freccero, E. Freeman, J. Halberstam, A. Jagose, 
C.S. Nealon, and T.H. Nguyen. 2007. ‘Theorizing Queer Temporalities: A Roundtable 
Discussion.’ GLQ: A Journal of Lesbian and Gay Studies 13 (2–3):177–195. 
Dover, K.J. 1974. Greek Popular Morality in the Time of Plato and Aristotle. Oxford: Basil 
Blackwell. 
———. 1989. Greek Homosexuality. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press. 
———. 2002. ‘Classical Greek Attitudes to Sexual Behaviour.’ In Sexuality and Gender in the 
Classical World: Readings and Sources, edited by L.K. McClure. Malden: Blackwell 
Publishers Ltd. 
Dreger, A.D. 1998. ‘“Ambiguous Sex”: Or Ambivalent Medicine? Ethical Issues in the 
Treatment of Intersexuality.’ The Hastings Report 28 (3):24–35. 
duBois, P. 1991. Centaurs and Amazons: Women and the Pre-History of the Great Chain of 
Being. Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press. 
Dunne, P. 2017. ‘Transgender Sterilisation Requirements in Europe.’ Medical Law Review 25 
(4):554–581. 
Eckert, C.A. 2003. The Historicisation of the Hermaphroditic/Intersexed Body: From 
Medicalisation to De-Medicalisation. Master of Gender History, University of Essex. 
Eckert, P., and S. McConnell-Ginet. 2003. Language and Gender, Cambridge. Cambridge 
University Press. 
Eckhert, E. 2016. ‘A Case for the Demedicalization of Queer Bodies.’ Yale Journal Of Biology 
And Medicine 89:239–246. 
Epstein, J. 1990. ‘Either/Or – Neither/Both: Sexual Ambiguity and the Ideology of Gender.’ 
Genders 7:99–142. 
Eugenides, J. 2002. Middlesex. London: Harper Collins Publishers. 
Evans, M. 2011. ‘Doing gender: Gender and women’s studies in the twenty first century.’ 
Women’s Studies International Forum 34 (6):603–610. 
Feder, E.K. 2009. ‘Imperatives of Normality: From “Intersex” to “Disorders of Sex 
Development”.’ GLQ: A Journal of Lesbian and Gay Studies 15 (2):225–247. 
Feinberg, L. 1996. Transgender Warriors: Making History from Joan of Arc to Dennis 
Rodman. Boston: Beacon Press. 
Ferrari, G. 2009. ‘Introduction.’ In Bodies and Boundaries in Graeco-Roman Antiquity, edited 
by T. Fögen and M.M. Lee. Berlin: Walter de Gruyter GmbH & Co. 




Foxhall, L. 2013. Studying Gender in Classical Antiquity. Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press. 
Freccero, C. 2006. Queer/Early/Modern. Durham, US: Duke University Press. 
———. 2013. ‘Forum: Historicism and Unhistoricism in Queer Studies.’ PMLA 128 (3):781–
782. 
Freeman, E. 2010. Time Binds: Queer Temporalities, Queer Histories. Durham and London: 
Duke University Press. 
Frontisi-Ducroux, F., and F. Lissarrague. 1990. ‘From Ambiguity to Ambivalence: A 
Dionysiac Excursion Through the ‘Anakreontic’ Vases.’ In Before Sexuality: The 
Construction of Erotic Experience in the Ancient Greek World, edited by D.M. 
Halperin, J.J. Winkler and F.I. Zeitlin. Princeton: Princeton University Press. 
Gamson, J. 1995. ‘Must Identity Movements Self-Destruct? A Queer Dilemma.’ Social 
Problems 42 (3):390–407. 
Garfinkel, H. 2006. ‘Passing and the Managed Achievement of Sex Status in an ‘Intersexed’ 
Person’.’ In The Transgender Studies Reader, edited by S. Stryker and W. Stephen. 
New York: Routledge. 
Gibson, M.A., D.T. Meem, and J. Alexander. 2014. Finding Out: An Introduction to LGBT 
Studies. Thousand Oaks, CA: SAGE Publications. 
Gleason, M.W. 1990. ‘The Semiotics of Gender: Physiognomy and Self-Fashioning in the 
Second Century C.E.’ In Before Sexuality: The Construction of Erotic Experience in 
the Ancient Greek World, edited by D.M. Halperin, J.J. Winkler and F.I. Zeitlin. 
Princeton: Princeton University Press. 
Goldberg, J., and M. Menon. 2005. ‘Queering History.’ PMLA 120 (5):1608–1617. 
Golden, M., and P. Toohey, eds. 2003. Sex and Difference in Ancient Greece and Rome. 
Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press. 
Goukowsky, P. 2012. Bibliothèque Historique: Fragments Tome III: Livres XXVII–XXXII. 
Paris: Les Belles Lettres. 
Grimal, P. 1986. The Dictionary of Classical Mythology. Translated by A.R. Maxwell-Hyslop. 
Basil Blackwell Publisher: Oxford. 
Gustafsson Sendén, M., E.A. Bäck, and A. Lindqvist. 2015. ‘Introducing a Gender-Neutral 
Pronoun in a Natural Gender Language: The Influence of Time on Attitudes and 
Behavior.’ Frontiers in Psychology 6:1–12. 
Halberstam, J. 2005. In a Queer Time and Place: Transgender Bodies, Subcultural Lives. New 
York: New York University Press. 
68 
 
Halperin, D.M. 1990. One Hundred Years of Homosexuality: and Other Essays on Greek Love. 
New York: Routledge. 
———. 2004. How to Do the History of Homosexuality. Chicago: The University of Chicago 
Press. 
Halperin, D.M., J.J. Winkler, and F.I. Zeitlin. 1990. Before Sexuality: The Construction of 
Erotic Experience in the Ancient Greek World. Princeton: Princeton University Press. 
Halsall, P. 2006. ‘Early Western Civilization Under the Sign of Gender.’ In A Companion to 
Gender History, edited by T.A. Meade and M.E. Wiesner-Hanks. Malden, MA: 
Blackwell Publishing. 
Hammons, P. 2007. ‘Queer Theory Reassessing History.’ CLIO 36 (2):237–304. 
Hanson, A.E. 1990. ‘The Medical Writers’ Woman.’ In Before Sexuality: The Construction of 
Erotic Experience in the Ancient Greek World, edited by D.M. Halperin, J.J. Winkler 
and F.I. Zeitlin. Princeton: Princeton University Press. 
Henderson, J. 1988. ‘Greek Attitudes Toward Sex.’ In Civilization of the Ancient 
Mediterranean, edited by M. Grant and R. Kitzinger. New York: Charles Scribner’s 
Sons. 
Hirschfeld, M. 2006. ‘Selections from The Transvestites: The Erotic Desire to Cross-Dress.’ 
In The Transgender Studies Reader, edited by S. Stryker and W. Stephen. New York: 
Routledge. 
Holmes, B. 2010. The Symptom and the Subject: The Emergence of the Physical Body in 
Ancient Greece. Princeton: Princeton University Press. 
———. 2012. Gender: Antiquity and Its Legacy. London: I.B. Tauris. 
———. 2016. ‘Cosmopoiesis in the Field of the Classical.’ In Deep Classics: Rethinking 
Classical Reception, edited by S. Butler. London: Bloomsbury Academic. 
Hord, L.C.R. 2016. ‘Bucking the Linguistic Binary: Gender Neutral Language in English, 
Swedish, French, and German.’ Western Papers in Linguistics / Cahiers linguistiques 
de Western 3 (4). 
Hornblower, S. 1994. Greek Historiography. Oxford: Oxford University Press. 
Irving, P.M.C.F. 1990. Metamorphosis in Greek Myths. Oxford: Clarendon Press. 
Jansen, L. 2016. ‘Borges and the Disclosure of Antiquity.’ In Deep Classics: Rethinking 
Classical Reception, edited by S. Butler. London: Bloomsbury Academic. 
Jardine, N. 2000. ‘Uses and Abuses of Anachronism in the History of the Sciences.’ History of 
Science 38 (3):251–270. 
69 
 
Jones, L.A. 1987. Morbidity and vitality: The interpretation of menstrual blood in Greek 
science. PhD, Stanford University. 
Jones, T., B. Hart, M. Carpenter, G. Ansara, W. Leonard, and J. Lucke. 2016. Intersex: Stories 
and Statistics from Australia. Cambridge: Open Book Publishers. 
Jospe, N., and M. Florence. 2004. ‘Hermaphroditus in Greco-Roman Myth: Lessons  and 
Hypotheses for Intersex Today.’ Journal of Pediatric Endocrinology and Metabolism 
17 (11):1472–1480. 
Jouanna, J. 1999. Hippocrates. Translated by M.B. DeBevoise. Baltimore: John Hopkins 
University Press. 
———. 2012. Greek Medicine from Hippocrates to Galen: Selected Paper. Translated by N. 
Allies. Leiden: Brill. 
Katz, J.T. 2016. ‘Etymological ‘Alterity’: Depths and Heights.’ In Deep Classics: Rethinking 
Classical Reception, edited by S. Butler. London: Bloomsbury Academic. 
Katz, M. 2003. ‘Ideology and ‘the Status of Women’ in Ancient Greece.’ In Sex and Difference 
in Ancient Greece and Rome, edited by M. Golden and P. Toohey. Edinburgh: 
Edinburgh University Press. 
Kent, S.K. 2006. ‘Gender Rules: Law and Politics.’ In A Companion to Gender History, edited 
by T.A. Meade and M.E. Wiesner-Hanks. Malden: Blackwell Publishing. 
Kessler, S.J., and W. McKenna. 2006. ‘Toward a Theory of Gender.’ In The Transgender 
Studies Reader, edited by S. Stryker and W. Stephen. Routledge: New York. 
King, H. 1998. Hippocrates’ Woman: Reading the Female Body in Ancient Greece. London: 
Routledge. 
———. 2013. ‘Sex and gender: the Hippocratic case of Phaethousa and her beard.’ Eugesta 
3:124–142. 
———. 2016. The One-Sex Body on Trial: The Classical and Early Modern Evidence. 
Abingdon: Routledge. 
Langlands, R. 2002. ‘‘Can you tell what it is yet?’: Descriptions of sex change in ancient 
literature.’ Ramus 31 (1–2):91–110. 
Laqueur, T. 1990. Making Sex: Body and Gender From the Greeks to Freud. Cambridge (MA): 
Harvard University Press. 
Lateiner, D. 2009. ‘Transsexuals and Transvestites in Ovid’s Metamorphoses.’ In Bodies and 
Boundaries in Graeco-Roman Antiquity, edited by T. Fögen and M.M. Lee. Berlin: 
Walter de Gruyter GmbH & Co. 
70 
 
Lee, M.M. 2009. ‘Body-Modification in Classical Greece.’ In Bodies and Boundaries in 
Graeco-Roman Antiquity, edited by T. Fögen and M.M. Lee. Berlin: Walter de Gruyter 
GmbH & Co. 
Lee, P., J. Schober, A. Nordenström, P. Hoebeke, C. Houk, L. Looijenga, G. Manzoni, W. 
Reiner, and C. Woodhouse. 2012. ‘Review of recent outcome data of disorders of sex 
development (DSD): Emphasis on surgical and sexual outcomes.’ Journal of Pediatric 
Urology 8:611–615. 
Lieber, E. 2003. ‘The Hippocratic ‘Airs, Waters, Places’ on Cross-Dressing Eunuchs: ‘Natural’ 
yet also ‘Divine’.’ In Sex and Difference in Ancient Greece and Rome, edited by M. 
Golden and P. Toohey. Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press. 
Loraux, N. 1990. ‘Herakles: The Super-Male and the Feminine.’ In Before Sexuality: The 
Construction of Erotic Experience in the Ancient Greek World, edited by D.M. 
Halperin, J.J. Winkler and F.I. Zeitlin. Princeton: Princeton University Press. 
MacDonald, H. dir. 2007. ‘Blink’. Doctor Who. Series 3. Episode 10. BBC One. 9 June. 
Marsh, J. 2014. Dictionary of Classical Mythology. Oxford: Oxbow Books. 
Martin, D.B. 2004. Inventing Superstition: From the Hippocratics to the Christians. 
Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press. 
Martindale, C., and R.F. Thomas, eds. 2006. Classics and the Uses of Reception. Malden, MA: 
Blackwell Publishing. 
Marzetti, H. 2017. ‘Proudly proactive: celebrating and supporting LGBT+ students in 
Scotland.’ Teaching in Higher Education 23 (6):701–717. 
Matzner, S. 2016. ‘Queer Unhistoricism: Scholars, Metalepsis, and Interventions of the Unruly 
Past.’ In Deep Classics: Rethinking Classical Reception, edited by S. Butler. London: 
Bloomsbury Academic. 
McCabe, S. 2005. ‘To Be and to Have:The Rise of Queer Historicism.’ GLQ: A Journal of 
Lesbian and Gay Studies 11 (1):119–134. 
McConnell-Ginet, S. 2011. Gender, sexuality, and meaning linguistic practice and politics. 
Oxford: Oxford University Press. 
Menon, M. 2013. ‘Forum: Historicism and Unhistoricism in Queer Studies.’ PMLA 128 
(3):782–784. 
Minto, C.L., L.-M. Liao, C.R.J. Woodhouse, P.G. Ransley, and S.M. Creighton. 2003. ‘The 
effect of clitoral surgery on sexual outcome in individuals who have intersex conditions 
with ambiguous genitalia: a cross-sectional study.’ The Lancet 361:1252–1257. 
71 
 
Namaste, V.K. 2000. Invisible Lives: The Erasure of Transsexual and Transgendered People. 
Chicago: University of Chicago Press. 
Norton, R. 1997. Myth of the Modern Homosexual: Queer History and the Search for Cultural 
Unity. London: Cassell. 
Phillips, E.D. 1973. Greek Medicine. London: Thames and Hudson. 
Prosser, J. 2006. ‘Judith Butler: Queer Feminism, Transgender, and the Transubstantiation of 
Sex.’ In The Transgender Studies Reader, edited by S. Stryker and S. Whittle. New 
York: Routledge. 
Purves, A. 2016. ‘Feeling on the Surface: Touch and Emotion in Fuseli and Homer.’ In Deep 
Classics: Rethinking Classical Reception, edited by S. Butler. London: Bloomsbury 
Academic. 
Roscher, W.H. 1886–1890. Ausführliches Lexikon der Griechischen und Römischen 
Mythologie, Vol 1.2. Leipzig: B. G. Teubner. 
Roscoe, W. 1996. ‘Priests of the Goddess: Gender Transgression in Ancient Religion.’ History 
of Religions 35 (3):195–230. 
Rose, S.O. 2010. What is Gender History? Cambridge: Polity Press. 
Rowlands, R.M. 2014. Eunuchs and Sex: Beyond Sexual Dichotomy in the Roman World. 
Doctor of Philosophy, University of Missouri-Columbia. 
Sacks, K.S. 1990. Diodorus Siculus and the First Century. Princeton: Princeton University 
Press. 
———. 1994. ‘Diodorus and his Sources: Conformity and Creativity.’ In Greek 
Historiography, edited by S. Hornblower. Oxford: Oxford University Press. 
Sahaj, T. 2011. ‘The Body as a Form of ID and Social Differentiation (in Ancient Greece).’ 
Human Movement 12 (4):385–390. 
Saslow, J. 1988. ‘“A Veil of Ice between My Heart and the Fire”: Michelangelo’s Sexual 
Identity and Early Modern Constructs of Homosexuality.’ Genders 2:77–90. 
Scarborough, J. 1988. ‘Medicine.’ In Civilization of the Ancient Mediterranean, vol II, edited 
by M. Grant and R. Kitzinger. New York: harles Scribner’s Sons. 
Schmitz, T.A. 2007. Modern Literary Theory and Ancient Texts: An Introduction. Oxford: 
Blackwell Publishing. 
Scott, J.W. 1986. ‘Gender: A Useful Category of Historical Analysis.’ The American Historical 
Review 91 (5):1053–1075. 
Sissa, G. 1990. ‘Maidenhood without Maidenhead: The Female Body in Ancient Greece.’ In 
Before Sexuality : The Construction Of Erotic Experience In The Ancient Greek World 
72 
 
edited by D.M. Halperin, J.J. Winkler and F.I. Zeitlin. Princeton: Princeton University 
Press. 
Smith, A. 2007. Girl meets boy. Edinburgh: Canongate Books Ltd. 
Smith, W.D., ed. 1994. Hippocrates. Vol. VII. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press. 
Stryker, S. 2006. ‘(De)Subjugated Knowledges: An Introduction to Transgender Studies.’ In 
The Transgender Studies Reader, edited by S. Stryker and S. Whittle. New York: 
Routledge. 
———. 2017. Transgender History: The Roots of Today’s Revolution. New York: Seal Press. 
Transphobia, T.R.V. 2018. Legal Gender Recognition: Change of gender. 
Traub, V. 2007. ‘The Present Future of Lesbian Historiography.’ In A Companion to Lesbian, 
Gay, Bisexual, Transgender and Queer Studies, edited by G.E. Haggerty and M. 
McGerry. Oxford: Blackwell. 
———. 2013. ‘Forum: Historicism and Unhistoricism in Queer Studies: Reply.’ PMLA 128 
(3):784–786. 
———. 2013. ‘The New Unhistoricism in Queer Studies.’ PMLA 128 (1):21–39. 
Van der Gracht, S. 2009. Hermaphroditism in Greek and Roman Antiquity. MA, University of 
Calgary. 
———. 2009. ‘Setting aside the loom: Hermaphroditism in ancient medicine.’ In The 
Proceedings of the 18th Annual History of Medicine Days Conference 2009, edited by 
L. Peterman, K. Sun and F.W. Stahnisch. Newcastle upon Tyne: Cambridge Scholars 
Publishing. 
von Krafft-Ebing, R. 2006. ‘Selections from: Psychopathia Sexualis with Special Reference to 
Contrary Sexual Instinct.’ In The Transgender Studies Reader, edited by S. Stryker and 
S. Whittle. New York: Routledge. 
Walton, F.R., ed. 1957. Library of History, Volume XI: Fragments of Books 21–32. Cambridge, 
MA: Harvard University Press. 
Waterlow, S. 1982. Nature, Change, and Agency in Aristotle’s Physics: A philosophical study. 
Oxford: Oxford University Press. 
Winkler, J.J. 1990. ‘Laying Down the Law: The Oversight of Men’s Sexual Behaviour in 
Classical Athens.’ In Before Sexuality: The Construction of Erotic Experience in the 
Ancient Greek World, edited by D.M. Halperin, J.J. Winkler and F.I. Zeitlin. Princeton: 
Princeton University Press. 
Withington, E.T., ed. 1928. On Wounds in the Head. In the Surgery. On Fractures. On Joints. 
Mochlicon. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press. 
73 
 
Zeitlin, F.I. 2002. ‘Playing the Other: Theater, Theatricality, and the Feminine.’ In Sexuality 
and Gender in the Classical World: Readings and Sources, edited by L.K. McClure. 
Malden, MA: Blackwell Publishers Ltd. 
 
 
